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HEALTH CARE ISSUES AFFECTING PEOPLE
WITH AN INTERSEX CONDITION OR DSD:
SEX OR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION?
Julie A. Greenberg*
People with an intersex condition or a Difference of Sex
Development (DSD) depend on health care professionals for critical
medical treatment. Many intersex activists assert that some current
medical practices are not in the best interests of patients with an
intersex condition. They contend that greater safeguards should be
adopted to ensure that the rights to liberty and autonomy of people with
a DSD are respected.
Thus far, intersex advocacy has focused on extralegal strategies.
The movement is at a point, however, where legal challenges to current
medical protocols could provide an additional tool to improve lifealtering health care practices. This Article examines whether the
intersex movement could effectively use legal frameworks developed by
feminists, the LGBT movement, and disability activists to advance its
goal of modifying current medical procedures that are based on sex,
gender, sexual orientation, and disability stereotypes.

* Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I want to thank Anne Tamar-Mattis
and Robert Irving for their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. My
sincere gratitude goes to the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for organizing an extraordinary
Symposium on LGBT Identity and the Law and inviting me to participate. This Article builds on
ideas presented in JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS
(2012), published by NYU Press.
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Other Symposium participants examined the problems
confronting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals (LGBs) seeking access to
effective health care. People with an intersex condition or a DSD
(Difference of Sex Development) and transgender people are
affected by similar issues of stigma and discrimination in the
provision of medical services. Intersex and transgender people,
however, face an additional problem not encountered by LGBs; they
are often dependent on health care professionals for critical medical
treatment related to their intersex and transgender conditions. The
number of health care professionals experienced in the treatment of
intersexuality and transgenderism is limited, and often medical
professionals’ treatment recommendations are at odds with the
desires of their intersex or transgender patients. Therefore, when
intersex and transgender people advocate for changes in the health
care provided to people in their communities, they must carefully
consider how the approaches they adopt will be received by the
medical professionals who, to a large extent, control their medical
treatment options.
This Article examines the unique health care issues confronting
the intersex community.1 It explores whether the intersex movement
could effectively use legal frameworks developed by the disability
rights movement, feminists, and LGBT activists and scholars to
advance the intersex movement’s major goal of modifying current
medical practices. Thus far, intersex advocacy has focused on
extralegal strategies.2 The movement is at the point, however, where
legal challenges to current medical protocols could provide an
additional useful tool to challenge life-altering health care practices.

1. A number of publications have addressed the special health care issues facing people
who are transgender. See, e.g., Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal Responses
to Health Care Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88 (2002);
Dean Spade et al., Medicaid Policy and Gender-Confirming Healthcare for Trans People: An
Interview with Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 497 (2010); NAT’L COAL. FOR LGBT
HEALTH, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRANS HEALTH PRIORITIES: A REPORT BY THE ELIMINATING
DISPARITIES WORKING GROUP (2004), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/Health
Priorities.pdf; Transgender Health and the Law: Identifying and Fighting Health Care
Discrimination, TRANSGENDER LAW CTR. (July 2004), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/
Health%20Law%20fact%20sheet.pdf.
2. JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 85–95
(2012).

Spring 2012]

HEALTH CARE ISSUES

853

Understanding the special health care concerns of people with
an intersex condition requires an understanding of the historical and
current medical treatment of intersexuality. The major intersex
conditions and the medical and societal treatment of people with an
intersex condition are described in Part I. Part II provides greater
detail regarding the intersex community’s concerns about current
medical protocols. Part III examines the informed consent doctrine
and explains why medical procedures performed on children with an
intersex condition should be scrutinized more carefully than they are
under current informed consent protocols. Part IV explores the
potential legal theories the intersex movement could adopt to
accomplish its primary goal of modifying current medical practices.
The Article concludes by examining whether the intersex movement
could effectively advance its agenda by adopting legal strategies
developed by feminists, LGBT scholars and activists, and disability
rights advocates.
I. TERMINOLOGY
AND HISTORY
A. What Is Intersexuality?
The meaning of the term “intersex” has varied and is still a topic
of sometimes intense discussion.3 Although doctors and activists in
the intersex community continue to debate exactly what conditions
qualify as “intersex,” the term is often used to include anyone with a
congenital condition whose sex chromosomes, gonads, or internal or
external sexual anatomy do not fit clearly into the binary
male/female norm.4 Some intersex conditions involve an
inconsistency between a person’s internal and external sexual
features. For example, some people with an intersex condition may
have female-appearing external genitalia, no internal female organs,
and testicles.5 Other people with an intersex condition may be born
3. Id. at 131–32; M. Morgan Holmes, Straddling Past, Present and Future, in CRITICAL
INTERSEX 1, 1 (Morgan Holmes et al. eds., 2009).
4. Intersex FAQ, INTERSEX INITIATIVE, http://www.ipdx.org/articles/intersex-faq.html (last
updated June 29, 2008); What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/
what_is_intersex (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
5. For example, women with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) have XY
chromosomes and normal functioning testes. Because of a receptor defect, their bodies are unable
to process the testosterone produced by the testes and their bodies follow the female
developmental path. External female genitalia will form but no internal female reproductive
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with genitalia that do not appear to be clearly male or female. For
example, a girl may be born with a larger than average clitoris and no
vagina.6 Similarly, a boy may be born with a small penis or no
penis.7 Some people with an intersex condition may also be born
with a chromosomal pattern that does not fall into the binary XX/XY
norm.8
Not all intersex conditions are apparent at the time of birth;
some conditions are not evident until a child reaches puberty.9 In
some conditions, a child whose genitalia appeared to be female at
birth will masculinize in puberty.10 Other intersex conditions may be
discovered at puberty when the child fails to develop typical male or
female traits. For example, the condition may be discovered when a
girl reaches puberty and fails to menstruate.11
Because experts do not agree on exactly which conditions fit
within the definition of intersexuality and some conditions are not
evident until years after a child is born, it is impossible to state with
precision exactly how many people have an intersex condition. Most
experts agree, however, that approximately 1–2 percent of people are
organs (uterus and fallopian tubes) will develop. See Melissa Hines et al., Psychological
Outcomes and Gender-Related Development in Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, 32
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 93, 93 (2003). For a more detailed description of this and other
intersex conditions, see ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 52–53 (2000); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 281–
92 (1999).
6. For example, infants with partial androgen insensitivity syndrome (PAIS) have XY
chromosomes and their bodies are able to partially process the androgens produced by their testes.
Their genitalia will partially masculinize. S. Faisal Ahmed et al., Phenotypic Features, Androgen
Receptor Binding, and Mutational Analysis in 278 Clinical Cases Reported as Androgen
Insensitivity Syndrome, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 658, 658 (2000).
7. See e.g., William G. Reiner & Bradley P. Kropp, A 7-Year Experience of Genetic Males
with Severe Phallic Inadequacy Assigned Female, 172 J. UROLOGY 2395 (2004).
8. For example, a number of people have chromosomal patterns that vary from the typical
XX and XY patterns. People have been found with XXX, XXY, XXXY, XYY, XYYY, XYYYY,
and XO (signifying only one sex chromosome). ROBERT POOL, EVE’S RIB: SEARCHING FOR THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX DIFFERENCES 70, 71 (1994).
9. See e.g., Julianne Imperato-McGinley et al., Steroid 5 Alpha-Reductase Deficiency in
Man: An Inherited Form of Male Pseudohermaphroditism, 186 SCIENCE 1213 (1974).
10. For example, people with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency have XY chromosomes and
testes but appear phenotypically female at birth. Despite a female appearance during childhood,
by the onset of puberty the body will masculinize. The testes descend, the voice deepens, muscle
mass substantially increases, and a penis that is capable of ejaculating develops from what was
thought to be the clitoris. Id.
11. For example, sometimes physicians are unaware that an infant with typical female
genitalia at birth has CAIS if the testes are nestled in the abdominal cavity. The condition may not
be discovered until puberty, when the girl fails to menstruate. See Hines et al., supra note 5, at 93.
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born with sexual features that vary from the medically defined norm
for male and female.12 Approximately one in 1,500 to one in 2,000
births involve a child who is born so noticeably atypical in terms of
genitalia that a specialist in sex differentiation is consulted and
surgical alteration is considered.13
The term “intersex” itself is controversial. Many doctors and
community activists favor abandoning the term “intersex” in favor of
the term “Disorders of Sex Development” (DSD). Some who support
the use of DSD terminology have argued that the term “disorder”
should be dropped and the initial “D” should stand for differences
rather than disorders.14 Throughout this Article, the terms intersex
and DSD (denoting Differences of Sex Development) will be used
interchangeably.
B. Intersexuality Compared to
Transsexuality and Transgenderism
Some people are confused about how intersexuality compares to
transsexuality and transgenderism. Generally, intersexuality refers to
a condition in which a person’s biological sex markers are not all
clearly male or female, while transgenderism and transsexuality are
used to describe behaviors or identities of people whose gender
expression, gender identity, or both, do not necessarily conform with
the binary sex norm or may be different from the sex assigned to
them at birth.15 Not all communities use the terms “transgender” and
“transsexual” consistently and different groups and individuals have
strong feelings about which term they prefer.16

12. Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000).
13. Id. Some experts place the number of genital anomalies at birth as 1 in 4,500. Peter A.
Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488
(2006).
14. For a more detailed discussion of the debates regarding terminology, see GREENBERG,
supra note 2, at 118–19; Holmes, supra note 3, at 6–7; and Alyson K. Spurgas, (Un)Queering
Identity: The Biosocial Production of Intersex/DSD, in CRITICAL INTERSEX, supra note 3, at 97,
97–111.
15. See GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender Glossary of Terms, GLAAD,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last updated May 2010).
16. One major LGBT organization, GLAAD, suggests the following definitions:
Transgender: An umbrella term (adj.) for people whose gender identity and/or gender
expression differs from the sex they were assigned at birth. The term may include but
is not limited to: transsexuals, cross-dressers and other gender-variant people.
Transgender people may identify as female-to-male (FTM) or male-to-female
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C. The Medical Treatment of
People with an Intersex Condition
Before the 1950s, infants who were born with an intersex
condition were not subjected to any medical treatment. If a child was
born with atypical genitalia, doctors would assign a sex to the infant
that they believed was most appropriate and would not otherwise
surgically or hormonally alter the child.17
During the middle of the twentieth century, however, two
developments occurred that changed the manner in which medical
experts treated the birth of a child with an intersex condition. First,
surgical techniques were developed that made it possible to modify
genitalia to what was considered to be a “cosmetically acceptable”
appearance.18 Second, the idea that gender identity was based upon
nurture and not nature became the conventional wisdom. In other
words, most doctors, sociologists, and psychologists believed that
children were born without an innate sense of being male or
female.19 They believed that gender identity would develop

(MTF). . . . Transgender people may or may not decide to alter their bodies hormonally
and/or surgically.
Transsexual (also Transexual): An older term which originated in the medical and
psychological communities. While some transsexual people still prefer to use the term
to describe themselves, many transgender people prefer the term transgender to
transsexual. Unlike transgender, transsexual is not an umbrella term, as many
transgender people do not identify as transsexual. Id.
The University of San Francisco Medical Center defines the terms as follows:
Transgender: literally “across gender”; sometimes interpreted as “beyond gender”; a
community-based term that describes a wide variety of cross-gender behaviors and
identities. This is not a diagnostic term, and does not imply a medical or psychological
condition.
....
Transsexual: a medical term applied to individuals who seek hormonal (and often, but
not always) surgical treatment to modify their bodies so they may live full time as
members of the sex category opposite to their birth-assigned sex (including legal
status). Some individuals who have completed their medical transition prefer not to use
this term as a self-referent. Ctr. of Excellence for Transgender Health, Transgender
Terminology, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., http://www.transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans?page=
protocol-terminology (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
17. Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of Intersexuality: From the Age of Gonads to the Age
of Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 345, 345–49 (1998) [hereinafter A History].
18. Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex”—or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in
the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 1998, at 24, 28 [hereinafter
Ambivalent Medicine].
19. Id. at 27–28.
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consistently with the appearance of the child’s genitalia and the
gender role in which the child was raised.20
Beginning in the 1950s, the standard protocol for treating
newborns with ambiguous genitalia involved surgical alteration of
“unacceptable” genitalia into “normal” genitalia.21 “Normal”
genitalia for boys required an “adequate” penis.22 If doctors believed
that an XY infant had an “adequate” penis, the child would be raised
as a boy.23 A child without an “adequate” penis would be surgically
altered and raised as a girl.24 The penis became the essential
determinant of sex because medical experts believed that a male
could only be a true man if he possessed a penis that was capable of
penetrating a vagina and allowed him to urinate in a standing
position.25
Medical technology at this time was capable of creating an
adequate vagina (defined as one that was capable of being penetrated
by an adequate penis), but the technology was not advanced enough
to create a fully functional penis (one that was capable of penetrating
a vagina). Therefore, surgeons would typically recommend to parents
that their XY infants with smaller penises or infants with other
genital ambiguities be raised as girls after the doctors surgically and
hormonally feminized them.26
Under this protocol, some XY infants were surgically and
hormonally altered and raised as girls because of the dominant belief
that growing up as a boy with an “inadequate” penis was too
psychologically traumatic to risk.27 Some of these XY infants had
fully functional testicles, and were therefore capable of reproducing.
Doctors would destroy their reproductive capacity rather than

20. Id.; John G. Hampson et al., Hermaphroditism: Recommendations Concerning Case
Management, 16 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 547 (1956); John Money et al.,
An Examination of Some Basic Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97
BULL. JOHN HOPKINS HOSP. 301 (1955).
21. Use of the terms “normal,” “adequate,” and “acceptable” genitalia in this Article reflect
the language used in the medical literature. The Author believes that the atypical genitalia
referred to in the literature are differences or variations and should not be labeled with the
normative terms “normal,” “adequate,” and “acceptable.”
22. Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27–28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 29.
26. SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 19 (1998).
27. See Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27.

858

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:849

recommending that they be raised with a penis that was considered
smaller than the norm.28
XX infants with a phallus that appeared to be more similar in
length to a penis than a clitoris were treated differently. Instead of
recommending that these children be raised as boys, doctors would
surgically remove the clitoris or reduce it to a size that they
considered acceptable,29 even if the surgery might diminish or
destroy the person’s ability to engage in satisfactory sex.30
The dominant protocol practiced during most of the last sixty
years was based on three interrelated sex and gender stereotypes.
First, heteronormativity dominated the equation. When determining
whether a child would be happier as a boy or a girl, doctors
considered the child’s capacity for engaging in traditional
heterosexual intercourse in adulthood.31 Doctors presumed that all
boys required a penis capable of being inserted in a vagina and all
girls required a vagina capable of accommodating a penis. They
operated on the assumption that everyone would want to engage in
heterosexual sexual relationships.32
Second, gender stereotypes about the importance to females of
physical appearance compared to sexual satisfaction also affected the
treatment decision.33 Doctors would remove a girl’s clitoris if they
decided the clitoris was too large.34 Doctors performed these
surgeries even though they often impaired the girl’s ability to engage
in satisfactory sex.
Finally, medical treatment decisions were dominated by
stereotypical presumptions about what doctors believed would be
important to males and females. Health care providers presumed that
males would prioritize the size of their penis over reproductive

28. See id. at 28.
29. L.H. Braga & J.L. Pippi Salle, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia: A Critical Appraisal of
the Evolution of Feminizing Genitoplasty and the Controversies Surrounding Gender
Reassignment, 19 EUR. J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 203, 204 (2009). Until the 1970s, doctors would
amputate the entire clitoris based on the belief that the clitoris was not necessary for normal
sexual function. Id.
30. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 59–61.
31. Id.; A History, supra note 17, at 349.
32. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 58–59.
33. Id.
34. A clitoris is considered acceptable if it is less than one centimeter in length. Phalluses
between 1 and 2.5–3 centimeters are considered unacceptable and are surgically altered under
current medical practices. Id. at 59.
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capabilities. Therefore, doctors would surgically and hormonally
feminize XY infants who may have been able to reproduce35 rather
than allow the children to grow up as boys with what doctors
believed was an inadequate phallus. The focus for females was
different. Doctors assumed that females would prioritize the ability
to procreate even if they could not fully enjoy the act that leads to
procreation.36 Therefore, doctors would retain reproductive capacity
for XX infants who were capable of conceiving and giving birth but
surgically remove or reduce the size of the clitoris, which often
diminished or destroyed a female’s ability to enjoy sexual acts.37
Because infants with an intersex condition were considered
“abnormal,” their births were typically shrouded in shame and
secrecy.38 Doctors often told parents half-truths about their children’s
condition.39 Parents were also encouraged to lie to their children
about the nature of their condition.40 The children were viewed as
“freaks”; their conditions were to be studied by physicians and
hidden from society.41
During the 1990s, a number of people began to question the
premises underlying the dominant treatment protocol for infants born
with “ambiguous” genitalia.42 Many authorities, including experts in
a variety of disciplines and intersex activist organizations, started to
challenge the standard medical practices for three reasons.
• They asserted that the dominant protocol, which was
based upon half-truths and secrecy, led to psychological
trauma because it exacerbated a person’s sense of shame
by reinforcing cultural norms of sexual abnormality.
People with an intersex condition who were subjected to
the standard treatment protocol perceived the practices as

35. Some of these males would have required Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) to
reproduce.
36. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 59; Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner,
Management of Intersex: A Shifting Paradigm, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 360, 363–64 (1998).
37. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 5, at 59.
38. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 97; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27.
39. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 97; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27–28.
40. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 95–96; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 27.
41. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 26, at 95; Ambivalent Medicine, supra note 18, at 31.
42. For an excellent overview of the harm caused by the traditional treatment protocol, see
Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants,
21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 64–74 (2006).
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a sexual violation leading to a profound loss of their
autonomy and extreme humiliation.
• They argued that gender identity could not be
manipulated by surgical and hormonal alteration.
Therefore, they contended that these interventions could
lead to irreversible harm if the child’s gender identity did
not develop in conformity with the surgically altered
genitalia.
• They asserted that in cases where the gender assignment
was not controversial, cosmetic genital surgeries caused
more physical and psychological trauma than allowing
the children to grow up with atypical genitalia. Many
adults with an intersex condition who had been subjected
to cosmetic genital surgery maintained that it often
caused a loss or diminishment of erotic response, genital
pain or discomfort, infections, scarring, urinary
incontinence, and cosmetically unacceptable genitalia.43
Based upon these concerns, many experts began to call for either
a moratorium or a severe limitation on the practice of surgically
altering infants with an intersex condition. They asserted that the
standard medical protocol should be modified in three ways. First,
they encouraged more honesty and openness about the treatment of
intersexuality to diminish the stigma and psychological trauma
experienced by people with an intersex condition and their family
members. Second, they called for an end to surgeries that feminized
XY infants on the flawed assumption that gender identity is
malleable. Third, they asserted that cosmetic genital surgeries that
often cause pain, scarring, incontinence, sexual dysfunction, and
other physical and psychological trauma could only be performed
43. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia, 7
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 55 (2000); Justine M. Schober, Feminizing Genitoplasty for Intersex, in
PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND UROLOGY: LONG TERM OUTCOMES 549, 556–57 (Mark D. Stringer et
al., eds., 1998); A History, supra note 17, at 352; Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex
Reassignment at Birth: A Long Term Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 298 (1997); William Reiner, To Be Male or Female—That Is
the Question, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 224 (1997); KESSLER, supra
note 26; Milton Diamond, Pediatric Management of Ambiguous and Traumatized Genitalia, 162
J. UROLOGY 1021 (1999); Kenneth I. Glassberg, Gender Assignment and the Pediatric Urologist,
161 J. UROLOGY 1309 (1999); Cheryl Chase, Surgical Progress Is Not the Answer to
Intersexuality, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 385, 389–91 (1998).

Spring 2012]

HEALTH CARE ISSUES

861

with the informed consent of the person undergoing the treatment. In
other words, they argued that parents should not have the power to
consent to these potentially traumatic surgeries.44
Advocates calling for these changes have been extremely
successful in accomplishing the first goal. The intersex movement
has been very effective in educating the medical community about
the harm of telling parents half-truths and lying to children. In 2006,
leading experts from a variety of disciplines published a “Consensus
Statement on the Management of Intersex Disorders” (“the 2006
Consensus Statement”).45 The 2006 Consensus Statement
emphasizes the importance of open communication and participatory
decision making. It encourages the use of a multidisciplinary
treatment team—including psychologists, psychiatrists, social
workers, and ethicists—who can adequately address the emotional
aspects of the parents’ decision-making process. It also urges treating
physicians to emphasize that intersexuality is not shameful and that
children have the potential to become well-adjusted adults.46
Intersex advocates have experienced some success in
accomplishing their second goal. XY infants with an “inadequate”
penis are no longer automatically surgically altered and raised as
girls. Some doctors have been persuaded to limit the number of
feminization surgeries on XY infants. The 2006 Consensus
Statement recommends that physicians carefully consider a number
of factors before assigning a gender to a newborn with an intersex
condition. These factors include: the etiology of the intersex
condition, genital appearance, surgical options, the need for life-long
hormone replacement therapy, the potential for fertility, the views of
the family, and sometimes, the circumstances relating to cultural
practices.47 The 2006 Consensus Statement recognizes that children
are born with an innate sense of gender that cannot be manipulated
by surgery and hormones.48 The 2006 Consensus Statement also
acknowledges that any type of surgical alteration of the genitalia may

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Supra note 43.
See Lee et al., supra note 13.
Id. at e490.
Id. at e491.
Id. at e492–93.
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be problematic because between 5 and 25 percent of people with a
DSD will ultimately reject the assigned gender.49
The intersex movement has not been as successful at
accomplishing its third goal: curtailing cosmetic genital surgeries
designed to conform a child’s genitalia to a binary sex norm.50 If a
child with an intersex condition is going to be raised as a girl, many
physicians will reduce the size of her clitoris if they believe it is too
large.51 If a child with an intersex condition is going to be raised as a
boy and the urethral opening appears someplace on the shaft rather
than on the tip of the penis, doctors typically perform surgeries to
modify the penis.52
II. THE INTERSEX MOVEMENT’S MAJOR GOAL:
RETURNING CONTROL OF THEIR BODIES
TO PEOPLE WITH AN INTERSEX CONDITION
Many medical experts and people with an intersex condition
believe that a moratorium should be imposed on all cosmetic genital
surgeries that are being performed without the express informed
consent of the person undergoing the treatment.53 In other words,
they believe that parents should not have the authority to consent to
these surgeries on behalf of their children. Instead, they assert that
these surgeries should be delayed until the children reach the age
when they have the capacity to determine for themselves whether to
undergo any type of medical treatment.54

49. Id. at e491–92. The rejection of the assigned gender varies with the type of DSD. For
example, more than 90 percent of people with 46,XX congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) and
all people with 46,XY complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) assigned female in
infancy develop a female gender identity. Id. Approximately 60 percent of people with 5-alphareductase deficiency who were assigned female in infancy and who virilize at puberty end up
living as males. Id. Twenty-five percent of the individuals with partial androgen insensitivity
syndrome (PAIS), androgen biosynthetic defects, and incomplete gonadal dysgenesis, are
dissatisfied with their sex of rearing, whether they were raised as males or females. Id.
50. See discussion infra notes 165–199 and accompanying text.
51. See discussion infra notes 165–169 and accompanying text.
52. See discussion infra notes 194–199 and accompanying text.
53. Supra note 43.
54. Supra note 43. Surgical interventions are not the only technique doctors have relied on to
produce “acceptable” genitalia. Some doctors have also experimented with other methods of
altering the appearance of the genitalia of infants with an intersex condition. See, e.g., Saroj
Nimkarn & Maria New, Prenatal Diagnosis and Treatment of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia,
67 HORMONE RES. 53 (2007). Instead of performing surgery after the child is born, some doctors
administer drugs to pregnant mothers who may be carrying a child with one type of intersex
condition, 21-hydroxylase deficiency congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), an adrenal disorder
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Those supporting a moratorium on cosmetic genital surgeries on
infants with a DSD believe that parents should not be given the
authority to consent to these surgeries performed on their infants
because:
• they are not medically necessary;
• they can interfere with sexual satisfaction;
• they frequently result in severe scarring and pain;
• multiple invasive surgeries are often required;
• children who undergo these surgeries often suffer from
stigma and trauma from being treated as abnormal and in
need of fixing;
• medically unnecessary surgery should not be used to
relieve the anxiety of the parents for their intersex child;
and
• the children’s sense of autonomy may be harmed when
they are old enough to understand the procedures and
their consequences.55
Recent studies support these assertions. In 2001, a group of
experts published a study in the respected British medical journal
The Lancet of forty-four adolescent patients, all of whom had
undergone surgery in infancy between 1979 and 1995.56 These
experts concluded that medically unnecessary cosmetic surgeries
should be delayed until a child is old enough to make the decision.57
Another publication from the United Kingdom concluded from a
study of fourteen patients with CAH that the results of early surgery
were disappointing and recommended that surgery generally be
delayed until after puberty.58 In 2011, a group of German physicians
also agreed with this assessment and recommended that genital
surgery generally be performed in adolescence and only with the

that can lead to the formation of atypical genitalia. Id. See infra notes 170–83 and accompanying
text for a more detailed discussion of this treatment protocol.
55. See Julie A. Greenberg, Legal Aspects of Gender Assignment, 13 ENDOCRINOLOGIST
277, 279–84 (2003); Tamar-Mattis, supra note 42.
56. Sarah M. Creighton et al., Objective Cosmetic and Anatomical Outcomes at Adolescence
of Feminising Surgery for Ambiguous Genitalia Done in Childhood, 358 LANCET 124, 124
(2001).
57. Id. at 124–25.
58. N.K. Alizai et al., Feminizing Genitoplasty for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia: What
Happens at Puberty?, 161 J. UROLOGY 1588, 1589 (1999).
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informed consent of the person undergoing the procedure.59 They
based their recommendation on the high dissatisfaction rates
expressed by people with a DSD in the surgical result, clitoral
arousal, and overall sex life.60
In 2004, the Hastings Center, a well-respected nonpartisan
organization that studies ethical standards in health and medicine,
convened a multidisciplinary group to consider the medical,
psychosocial, and ethical issues associated with the care of children
born with atypical genitalia. This group of experts concluded that it
is unethical to perform surgery to normalize the appearance of
people’s genitalia without the informed consent of the patients (the
children).61 They determined that parental consent was not adequate
to protect the child’s interests.62 They acknowledged that some
surgeons maintain that technical considerations warrant some early
surgeries, but they concluded that the irrevocable nature of the
surgery warranted extreme caution and questioned whether surgical
expediency could ever outweigh the psychosocial and ethical
considerations for waiting until children reach the age when they can
meaningfully participate in the decision.63
The 2006 Consensus Statement provides the most thorough
analysis of the current treatment protocols for children with an
intersex condition. It encourages physicians to adopt a more cautious
approach before undertaking surgical intervention. It suggests that
clitoral reduction be limited to cases of severe genital virilization (the
development of male sex characteristics in a female) and should not
be performed on all clitorises that are larger than the norm.64 It
emphasizes that the focus of such surgeries should be on functional
outcome (orgasmic function and erectile sensation) rather than on
cosmetic appearance.65 It also acknowledges that absolutely no
evidence exists to support the long-standing assumption that genital

59. Birgit Kohler et al., Satisfaction with Genital Surgery and Sexual Life of Adults with XY
Disorders of Sex Development: Results from the German Clinical Evaluation Study, 97
J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 1441 (2011).
60. Id.
61. Joel Frader et al., Health Care Professionals and Intersex Conditions, 158 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 426, 427–28 (2004).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Lee et al., supra note 13, at e491.
65. Id.
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surgery carried out for cosmetic purposes during the first year of life
relieves parental distress or improves the parent-child bond.66
The 2006 Consensus Statement and its recommended guidelines
have been applauded by many and endorsed by the American
Academy of Pediatrics.67 The 2006 Consensus Statement, however,
fails to resolve the remaining vital issue: should medically
unnecessary cosmetic infant genital surgery ever be performed?
Some have criticized the 2006 Consensus Statement for supporting
surgery in cases of severe virilization even though current studies do
not support the conclusion that current surgical techniques preserve
sensation.68 Others have supported the 2006 Consensus Statement’s
affirmation of the parents’ right to consent to genital surgery.69 No
studies, however, have examined the effect that the 2006 Consensus
Statement has had on current practices.
III. POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO
ENHANCING THE AUTONOMY OF
PEOPLE WITH AN INTERSEX CONDITION
People calling for a moratorium on cosmetic genital surgeries
being performed on infants with an intersex condition believe that
parents should not have the legal authority to consent to these
surgeries. No one questions whether the parents making these
decisions are motivated by love and a genuine desire to help their
children. Those who support a moratorium are concerned, however,
that parents may not be able to completely comprehend what might
be in their children’s long-term best interests. They emphasize that
parents should be provided complete information about their
children’s conditions and offered appropriate professional counseling
and peer support. They assert that medical treatment should be
limited to conditions that pose an actual physical health risk. They
believe that only the affected children, when they are old enough to

66. Id.
67. Id. at e492; Section on Endocrinology Policy, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, http://
www2.aap.org/sections/endocrinology/endopolicy.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
68. Katrina A. Karkazis, Early Genital Surgery to Remain Controversial, 118 PEDIATRICS
814, 814 (2006).
69. Id.
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appropriately assess the risks and benefits, should have the power to
decide whether they want to undergo cosmetic surgery.70
Most doctors, however, oppose a moratorium on infant genital
cosmetic surgeries and believe that surgical alteration is in the best
interests of a child born with an intersex condition. They are
concerned that an untreated child may suffer psychological trauma
from growing up with atypical-appearing genitalia. They believe this
potential risk of psychological harm is more detrimental than are the
potential risks of surgery. They assert that parents should continue to
be allowed to consent to these surgeries because they are in the best
position to determine what treatment would be in their child’s best
interests.71 This group believes that parents who are fully educated
about all the risks and benefits of the different protocols should have
the authority to determine what is in the best interests of their child.72
A significant minority of parents now decline or postpone
surgery on their children with atypical genitalia. According to one
comprehensive study published in 2007, however, most parents still
choose to consent to genitoplasty on behalf of their infants.73
Adults with an intersex condition also disagree about whether
parents should have the ability to consent to these surgeries during
their child’s infancy. One study, published in 2004, surveyed
seventy-two patients with an intersex condition and XY

70. See e.g., Beh & Diamond, supra note 43; Chase, supra note 43, at 385; Diamond &
Sigmundson, supra note 43; Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics in the Surgical
Assignment of Sex, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 398, 406 (1998); Alyssa Connell Lareau, Who Decides?
Gender Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 92 GEO. L.J. 129 (2000); Tamar-Mattis,
supra note 42; Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, Management of Intersex: A Shifting
Paradigm, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 360 (1998).
71. KATRINA KARKAZIS, FIXING SEX: INTERSEX, MEDICAL AUTHORITY, AND LIVED
EXPERIENCE 134–35 (2008); see also Claudia Wiesemann et al., Ethical Principles and
Recommendations for the Medical Management of Differences of Sex Development
(DSD)/Intersex in Children and Adolescents, 169 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 671, 674–76 (2009)
(discussing ethical principles and guidelines for the medical treatment of infants with a DSD).
72. See, e.g., S. F. Ahmed et al., Intersex and Gender Assignment: The Third Way?, 89
ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 847 (2004); Robert M. Blizzard, Intersex Issues: A Series of
Continuing Conundrums, 110 PEDIATRICS 616 (2002); J. Daaboul & J. Frader, Ethics and the
Management of the Patient with Intersex: A Middle Way, 14 J. PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY &
METABOLISM 1575 (2001); Wiesemann et al., supra note 71.
73. Melissa Parisi et al., A Gender Assessment Team: Experience with 250 Patients over a
Period of 25 Years, 9 GENETICS MED. 348 (2007); see also, KARKAZIS, supra note 71, at 134–35
(concluding, after conducting interviews with parents and visiting Web site support groups, that a
fair number of parents continue to choose genital surgery for their children).
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chromosomes.74 Some of the surveyed patients had been raised as
males and others had been raised as females. Not all had been
subjected to surgery as infants, and those who had been surgically
altered had undergone a variety of surgical interventions. Opinions
about the appropriate timing for genital surgery varied. Forty-six
percent believed that surgery should not be performed before
adolescence, and an additional 4 percent believed surgery should not
be performed before a child reached elementary school age.75 Fortynine percent supported surgery during infancy or toddlerhood.76 In
other words, almost one-half of the people interviewed supported
delaying surgery until adolescence or adulthood when the person
undergoing the procedure can meaningfully participate in the
decision-making process. The authors of the study recognized that
their sample size was small and may not have been representative.
They called for those who are in a position to control the guidelines
for treatment of infants with an intersex condition to obtain
additional data to determine the optimal treatment protocol.77
Until comprehensive retrospective studies are conducted that
clearly establish whether surgical alteration of an infant with an
intersex condition is beneficial, these interventions will continue to
be controversial. Given the critical interests at stake and the
polarized nature of the debate, legal institutions will likely be
brought into the dispute. Legislatures may be asked to enact statutes
and, in the absence of legislative action, courts may be asked to
intervene. Thus far, no country or state has enacted controlling
legislation78 and Colombia is the only jurisdiction in which the
highest court has rendered an opinion on this issue. Therefore, if
courts are asked to resolve the legal, medical, and ethical issues

74. H.F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg et al., Attitudes of Adult 46, XY Intersex Persons to Clinical
Management Policies, 171 J. UROLOGY 1615, 1615 (2004).
75. Id. at 1617.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1618.
78. South Africa considered adopting legislation. See Legislation Mooted to Regulate
Intersex Surgery, ANC DAILY NEWS BRIEFING (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.e-tools.co.za/news
brief/2004/news1201.txt. The city of San Francisco also held hearings on this issue and issued a
report condemning current practices. See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N OF THE CITY & CNTY. OF
S.F., A HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEDICAL “NORMALIZATION” OF INTERSEX
PEOPLE 4 (2005), available at http://www.sf-hrc.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/sfhumanrights/Committee_
Meetings/Lesbian_Gay_Bisexual_Transgender/SFHRC%20Intersex%20Report(1).pdf.
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surrounding consent to the treatment of children born with an
intersex condition, the outcome is far from clear.
Courts or legislatures could modify current practices to ensure
that people with an intersex condition have their right to autonomy
and decision-making power over health care decisions affecting them
respected. Legal institutions could ban these procedures unless they
are performed with the informed consent of the person undergoing
the procedure. Alternatively, they could allow the procedures to
continue but mandate oversight by a court and/or a hospital ethics
board. Finally, they could impose enhanced informed consent
procedures.79
A. The Informed Consent Doctrine
The most likely legal doctrine that will be used to challenge the
current medical treatment protocol for infants with an intersex
condition is the doctrine of informed consent. The informed consent
doctrine protects an individual’s right to bodily integrity and selfdetermination and respects patients’ rights to autonomous decision
making. The informed consent doctrine requires that doctors (1) fully
inform their patients about all material risks associated with any
proposed medical treatment; and (2) receive the patient’s consent to
the procedure. The principle of autonomy requires deference to a
patient’s treatment choices unless the government has a compelling
interest that justifies overriding a competent person’s right to
autonomy. Courts rarely find such an overriding state interest.
The informed consent doctrine is premised on the patient’s
ability to understand and weigh the risks and benefits of the
suggested procedure. Sometimes patients are unable to reach an
informed decision because they are too young or they suffer from a
disabling condition that precludes them from understanding the
advantages and disadvantages of a procedure. In these cases,
informed permission is required from a surrogate, typically the
minor’s (or incompetent’s) parent(s) or guardian(s).80
Parents’ decisions on behalf of their children are generally
accorded great deference for two reasons. First, legal institutions
79. For the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, see GREENBERG, supra
note 2, at 35–43.
80. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission,
and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 314 (1995).
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presume that parents will make decisions that are in the best interests
of their children.81 Second, the Constitution protects family privacy
and parental authority.82 Therefore, courts rarely become involved in
parental medical decisions,83 as long as the parents and the
physicians agree on the treatment.84
Typically, parents are allowed to consent to medical treatment
for their minor children, even if the treatment involves a significant
risk of harm. Parents can consent to inoculations, complex surgeries,
experimental treatments, radiation, chemotherapy, and other
potentially harmful procedures. The law presumes that parents will
weigh the potential benefits and risks of each procedure and make
decisions that are in the best interest of their children.85
In some circumstances, however, courts and legislatures have
determined that complete deference to parental decisions may not be
in a child’s best interests. If the potential gravity of the consequences
of the medical treatment is particularly severe and the situation
involves potentially conflicting interests, courts may carefully review
parents’ consent to the treatment of their child. The classic cases
requiring close scrutiny involve (1) terminating the life of a child in a
persistent vegetative state; (2) authorizing an organ donation to
benefit another family member (typically a sibling of the

81. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (involving decisions by parents to
institutionalize their children with a psychiatric condition).
82. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 660, 667 (2000) (involving the right of a
parent to determine visitation by grandparents); Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.
83. Courts have intervened when they believe the parents are not capable of reaching a wellreasoned decision that would be in the child’s best interests. See, e.g., A.D.H. v. State Dep’t of
Human Res., 640 So. 2d 969 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (ordering appropriate HIV treatment over the
mother’s objection when the mother adamantly denied that her child was infected with HIV).
84. Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 39. Litigation regarding parental consent may occur
when parents refuse to agree to a medically recommended procedure. These cases typically arise
when a doctor suggests a potentially life-saving treatment for a child and the parents refuse to
consent because the procedure violates the parents’ religious beliefs. See, e.g., In re Petra B., 265
Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1989) (ordering treatment of a minor’s serious burns over the objections
of the parents, who wanted to treat the burns with herbal remedies for religious reasons). These
cases involve unique issues involving the First Amendment. Cases involving infants with an
intersex condition are not analogous to the religious-refusal cases for two reasons. First, in the
cases involving an infant with an intersex condition, doctors and parents agree about the desired
treatment, but in the religious-refusal cases, the doctor is recommending a procedure that the
parent is refusing. Second, the parental decision in the intersex cases is not based on religious
practices and therefore does not involve First Amendment issues.
85. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 39.
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incompetent child); and (3) approving the involuntary sterilization of
a minor or incompetent adult.86
In these cases, courts do not simply defer to the parents. Instead,
they require judicial oversight of these procedures for three reasons.
First, these choices potentially infringe on the children’s
constitutionally protected rights, including the right to life and the
right to reproductive choice. Second, they involve a significant risk
of harm to the children. Finally, parents may be in a position in
which it is difficult for them to separate their child’s interests from
their own interests. For example, in the organ-donation cases, parents
are making a decision that may save the life of one child who
requires a kidney transplant and at the same time expose their other
child, the kidney donor, to a serious risk of harm. Similarly, in
involuntary-sterilization cases, parents may want to spare their child
from the difficulties of bearing and rearing a child, but they may also
be motivated by their concern about having to care for a grandchild,
should their incompetent child become pregnant or father a child.
Therefore, courts will carefully scrutinize these decisions to ensure
that the child’s constitutional rights are protected and that the
decision is in the best interests of the child.87
In addition to termination of life, organ donation, and
sterilization procedures, some jurisdictions have ruled that other
invasive
procedures—including
involuntary
psychosurgery,
electroconvulsive therapy, and administration of antipsychotic
medications—are life-altering treatments that require additional
measures to protect the child’s rights.88 Recently, the Washington
Protection and Advocacy System (WPAS), a federally funded
watchdog agency charged with investigating discriminatory
treatment of people with a disability, investigated a case involving
the administration of growth-attenuating hormones and the removal
of the uterus and breast-bud tissue from a developmentally disabled

86. See Jennifer Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
45–46 (2000).
87. See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
88. See DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
REGARDING THE “ASHLEY TREATMENT” 17–18 (2007), available at http://www.disabilityrights
wa.org/home/Full_Report_InvestigativeReportRegardingtheAshleyTreatment.pdf.
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child. The WPAS determined that these types of procedures, because
they were invasive and irreversible, also required court supervision.89
B. The Informed Consent Doctrine Applied to
Surgeries Performed on Infants with an Intersex Condition
Allowing parents to consent to cosmetic genital surgery on an
infant with an intersex condition involves similarly complex issues.
Currently, parents can consent to these surgeries, and these
procedures are not subjected to any external oversight or approval.
Based on the important interests at stake, courts or legislatures could
be convinced to place stricter limitations on the circumstances under
which these procedures can be performed. The extent of the
regulation would depend on many factors. The most important
consideration would be whether the procedure affects a
constitutionally protected right.
1. Procedures That Result in Sterilization Affect a Constitutionally
Protected Right and Should Require Court Approval
Medical procedures that result in sterilization affect the
constitutionally protected right to reproduce and require strict
oversight. In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,90 the Supreme Court
began to impose strict restrictions on sterilization practices. The
Court ruled that procreative choice is a fundamental human right
protected by the U.S. Constitution.91 Thus, the Court limited the
circumstances under which states could sterilize people without their
consent.92
After Skinner, some states adopted statutes regulating
sterilization practices to ensure that a person’s reproductive capacity
would not be terminated inappropriately. These regulations typically

89. Id. at 22. WPAS is now called Disability Rights Washington. For a more detailed
discussion see infra notes 100–01 and 210–20 and accompanying text.
90. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
91. Id. at 541.
92. Skinner involved an Oklahoma statute that allowed the government to sterilize habitual
criminals. Id. at 536. A constitutional claim based on the fundamental right to reproductive
freedom must be based on a governmental act and not based on the actions of private individuals.
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974). Therefore, a doctor who is not
employed by the state or a parent could not be held liable for violating a child’s constitutionally
protected right to reproduction. Because reproduction is considered a fundamental right, however,
a number of states have limited the ability of private actors to engage in actions that affect
reproductive freedom. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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require judicial oversight and approval of sterilizations performed on
people who are not capable of consenting to the procedure
themselves. Full protection of reproductive rights requires that a
court approve an involuntary sterilization before it is performed.
During the judicial hearing, the child who will be subjected to
sterilization must have a separate legal representative who advocates
zealously on the child’s behalf.93
Court approval is clearly required when the sole purpose of the
procedure is sterilization. If the main reason for the medical
treatment is something other than sterilization (e.g., removal of a
cancerous growth) and sterilization is a byproduct, many doctors and
attorneys believe that they can proceed without court approval.94 The
WPAS, however, has concluded that all sterilizations of
developmentally disabled individuals, regardless of the primary
motivation for the procedures, require court approval.95
Reproductive rights are compromised in a number of medical
procedures performed on infants with an intersex condition. A
number of current medical practices have the potential to destroy
reproductive capacity. For example, doctors will remove the female
reproductive organs of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia
who are going to be raised as males, thus destroying their ability to
reproduce. In addition, doctors will remove the testicles of infants
with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome, which could
potentially affect the children’s future reproductive capacity.96
Finally, although the practice is no longer supported in the medical
literature, anecdotal evidence indicates that some doctors may still
recommend raising XY children with an “inadequate” penis as

93. States that have adopted legislation controlling the sterilization of people who are not
competent to consent include Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128 to -131 (1997);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-691 to -700 (1997); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34,
§§ 7001–7016 (1998)); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.205–.335 (1995); and Vermont, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8705–8716 (1987). In states that do not have controlling legislation, courts
have ruled that these procedures cannot be performed without a court order. See, e.g., In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. 1994); In re
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wa. 1980).
94. See CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88.
95. Id.
96. Current technology does not exist that would allow women with CAIS to reproduce.
Presently, the gonads cannot produce sperm that could be used for reproduction. It is possible,
however, that future technology could allow for reproductive ability. When doctors make their
recommendations, the potential for reproduction should be considered.
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female. If the parents agree in these cases, the doctors will remove
the testicles and eliminate reproductive capacity.
Although the sterilization statutes and cases have considered
only children with developmental disabilities, the principles relied on
and the rules adopted in these actions should apply with equal force
to prohibit the sterilization of children with an intersex condition.97
In fact, sterilizations of infants born with an intersex condition could
be considered less justifiable than are sterilizations of profoundly
disabled children. When infants with an intersex condition mature,
they will be able to provide their informed consent to a procedure,
whereas profoundly disabled children will never be in a position to
provide informed consent. Thus, the justification for sterilizing
infants with an intersex condition is even less defensible.
Sterilizations of infants with a DSD will eventually be reviewed
by courts. First, doctors or hospitals who are concerned about
potential liability may seek court approval before they proceed with
interventions that involve sterilization.98 In addition, people who
have had their reproductive ability terminated without their consent
may initiate lawsuits. Finally, governmental agencies could initiate
investigations into these practices. When these lawsuits arise, courts
should ban these types of procedures unless there is clear evidence
that the sterilization would be in the child’s best interests.
2. Because of Their Invasive and Irreversible Nature,
Cosmetic Genital Surgeries Not Causing Sterilization
Should Be Subjected to Heightened Scrutiny
Procedures that do not affect reproductive capacity do not
involve the same fundamental rights as the sterilization cases. As a
result, these procedures are not entitled to the same constitutional
protection. Generally, parents’ rights to make medical decisions on
97. In an unpublished opinion, a doctor was held liable for removing gonads and rendering a
minor infertile when he proceeded without the consent of the minor or her parents. See, e.g.,
Before the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice Stipulation and Order in the Matter of the
Medical License of Michael H. Wipf, M.D., Date of Birth 1/31/1953, License Number 28,237 (on
file with author).
98. See, e.g., Case I Part I (Sentencia SU-337/99), INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. (May 12,
1999), http://www.isna.org/node/166 [hereinafter Sentencia SU-337/99, Pt. I]; infra note 105.
Doctors were responsible for initiating this case, which eventually resulted in the Constitutional
Court of Colombia imposing safeguards to protect infants born with an intersex condition. The
Colombian doctors were concerned that they might be held liable for performing cosmetic genital
surgery, so they told the parents that they would not proceed without a court order.
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behalf of their minor children are respected. Typically, if parents
consent to a medically recommended procedure, their decision is not
subject to any type of review.99
Not all parental decisions, however, are granted automatic
deference. Although legal authority is sparse, some disability
organizations have asserted that judicial approval is required for
parental consent in cases involving invasive and irreversible
procedures other than sterilization. For example, in a recent
investigation involving the removal of the uterus and breast-bud
tissue of a developmentally disabled child and the administration of
hormones to her, the WPAS determined that these types of
procedures should only be undertaken with court supervision.100 In
its extensive report, the WPAS stated,
[T]he rights of parents to make treatment and other
decisions for their minor children, however, are not
unfettered. “[T]he state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting
the child’s welfare.” [Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 167 (1944).] Parents generally have the right to make
medical decisions for their minor children and provide
informed consent for various procedures; however, courts
have limited this authority when parents seek highly
invasive and/or irreversible medical treatment of their
minor children. [Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 585 (1979).]
Courts and the Washington State Legislature, for example,
have held that parents do not have the authority to consent
to medical treatment in cases involving involuntary
inpatient psychiatric care, [Id. at 584; State ex rel. T.B. v.
CPC Fairfax Hosp., 918 P.2d 497, 503–04 (Wash. 1996);]
the administration of electro convulsive therapy in nonemergency life-saving situations, [In re A.M.P., 708 N.E.2d
1235, 1240–1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.34.355(9) (2009);] psychosurgery, [Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.34.355(10) (2009);] abortions for mature minors,
99. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 38–39. No oversight is typically imposed as long
as the procedure is solely to benefit the patient. If the procedure is being performed to benefit
another person—for example, removing a kidney for transplant into the patient’s sibling—court
approval is necessary. See Rosato, supra note 86, at 57.
100. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 18–19.
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[State v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260, 265–66 (Wash. 1975);]
sterilization, [In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980); In re
K.M., 816 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); In re Mary Moe,
432 N.E.2d 712, 716–717 (Mass. 1982); In re Rebecca D.
Nilsson, 471 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983);] and other
similar invasive medical treatments, [State v. Baxter, 141
P.3d 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (denying a father the right to
circumcise his eight year old son with a hunting knife),]
particularly where the interest of the parent may not be the
same as those of the child [In re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 640; see
also Koome, 530 P.2d at 263].101
Many procedures performed on infants with a DSD have the
potential to make orgasm difficult or impossible and may cause
serious long-term medical complications.102 These invasive and
potentially irreversible surgeries can permanently and dramatically
infringe on the rights of people with an intersex condition to bodily
integrity and sexual self-determination.103 In addition, safeguards are
needed because parents may be making decisions at a time when
they are suffering distress about giving birth to and raising an
“abnormal” child. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for
parents to determine objectively the treatment that would be in their
child’s long-term interests, especially because the issue may affect
sexuality when the child becomes an adult. Thus, these procedures
should only be allowed under conditions that ensure that the child’s
rights are protected.104
101. Id.
102. See Lee et al., supra note 13, at e491.
103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing that a liberty interest extends
beyond reproductive rights). In Lawrence, the Court held that a statute that criminalized same-sex
sodomy was unconstitutional. The Court indicated that its holding would apply to situations
beyond the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts. Id. at 574 (“[T]hese matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992))). A court could accordingly find that children with a DSD should have the
power to determine for themselves whether they want to undergo medical procedures that could
have a profound effect on their sexual relationships and their sense of self.
104. Alicia Ouellette has argued that parental decisions authorizing medical and surgical
interventions to sculpt children’s bodies should be analyzed under a trust-based construct that
would require neutral third-party approval, rather than giving complete deference to the parents’
decisions. See Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J.
955 (2010).
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Only one high court, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, has
considered whether parents can consent to cosmetic genital surgery
being performed on their children with a DSD.105 Because of a court
decision in 1995, doctors in Colombia were concerned about
potential liability for performing genital surgery on infants with an
intersex condition. In two cases, doctors recommended that the
children they were treating undergo cosmetic genital surgery, but the
doctors who made the recommendation refused to proceed without a
court order. The parents of the two children sought court authority
for the procedures to occur.106
The Constitutional Court of Colombia considered evidence that
supported the traditional model as well as evidence that criticized
this model and supported a moratorium on cosmetic genital surgeries
on infants with an intersex condition. The court concluded that the
uncertain and conflicting evidence put the law at an impasse. The
court reasoned that prohibiting surgery until the children reach the
age of consent would be engaging in social experimentation, but
allowing the surgery to continue under the standard protocol would
not ensure that the best interests of the children were protected.107
The Colombian court decided that surgical modification of an
infant with an intersex condition must be treated differently from
other types of parental consent cases. The court decided that the
traditional informed consent rules do not guarantee that parents are in
the best position to make a decision on behalf of their child.108 The
court was concerned because (1) parents typically lack information
about intersexuality; (2) intersexuality is viewed as a disease that
must be cured; and (3) treating physicians frequently convey a false
sense of urgency to provide a quick cure.109 The Colombian court
recognized that, under these circumstances, parents cannot easily
distinguish their own fears and concerns from considerations of the
105. See Case 2 (Sentencia T-551/99), INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. (Aug. 2, 1999),
http://www.isna.org/node/126; Sentencia SU-337/99, Pt. I, supra note 98. These decisions are
reported in Spanish and can be found at Texts of Colombia Decisions, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N.
AM., http://www.isna.org/node/516 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). For a translation of a portion of
decision SU-337/99 into English, see Nohemy Solórzano-Thompson, The Rights of Intersexed
Infants and Children: Decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court, Bogotá, Colombia, 12
May 1999 (SU-337/99), in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 122 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
106. Solórzano-Thompson, supra note 105, at 122.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 129–30.
109. See id. at 130, 132.
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“best interests” of their child.110 The court concluded that parents
may approve these surgeries to “normalize” their children, whom
they view as “strange beings.”111
The Colombian court decided to follow a middle path to protect
the human rights of infants. It struck a balance between allowing
parents full autonomy to consent to surgical alteration on behalf of
their infant and barring all such surgeries.112 The court called on
legal and medical institutions to establish “qualified and persistent”
informed consent procedures to protect the rights of children with an
intersex condition until comprehensive studies clearly establish the
course of treatment that is in these children’s best interests.113
The court held that “qualified and consistent informed consent”
requires that the following conditions be met.
1. The consent must be in writing.
2. The information provided must be complete. The parents
must be informed about the dangers of current
treatments, the existence of other paradigms, and the
possibility of delaying surgeries and giving adequate
psychological support to the children.
3. The authorization must be given on several occasions
over a reasonable time period to ensure the parents have
enough time to truly understand the situation.114
Advocates seeking to limit the number of infant cosmetic genital
surgeries could adopt a number of approaches. They could call for a
complete moratorium on all such surgeries performed without the
informed consent of the person undergoing the treatment.
Alternatively, they could advocate in favor of an enhanced informed
consent standard similar to the procedures adopted in Colombia.
Finally, they could seek regulations that would require supervision or
approval of these procedures by an independent entity, such as a
court or a hospital ethics committee.
Convincing courts or legislatures to mandate any of these
approaches will require that intersex advocates develop persuasive
legal arguments supporting their assertion that cosmetic genital
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 131.
Id.
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surgeries should be subjected to enhanced scrutiny.115 Two legal
frameworks that could support their arguments, sex discrimination
and disability discrimination, are discussed in the next section.
IV. INFANT COSMETIC GENITAL SURGERIES:
SEX OR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION?
Most states have adopted legislation prohibiting discrimination
in the provision of health care.116 In addition, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which was signed into law in
2010, mandates that health care be provided on a nondiscriminatory
basis.117 The PPACA does not specifically address the medical
treatment of people with an intersex condition, but it does prohibit
both sex and disability discrimination.
The PPACA provides:
[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited
under . . . title IX of the Education Amendment Act of 1972
(20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) [prohibiting sex discrimination] . . .
or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.
794) [prohibiting disability discrimination], be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under, any health program or
activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial
assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of
insurance, or under any program or activity that is

115. If the surgery results in sterilization, heightened scrutiny should be required and doctors
should not be able to proceed without court review. The remainder of this Article focuses on
surgeries not resulting in sterilization and explains why these surgeries should also be subjected
to regulation and oversight.
116. States typically prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and disability in the provision
of health care under their public accommodations statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2011); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501–4504 (2009); D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.02(24), -1402.31 (2010); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 489-2 to -3 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 to -103 (2011); IOWA CODE
§§ 216.2(13), .7 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553(8), 4592 (2010); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 272, §§ 98, 92A (2009); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.11, .03 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 233.010 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:2, -A:17 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4
to -5 (2010); N.M. STAT. §§ 28-1-7, -2 (2011); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(9), 296(2)(a) (2011);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-2 to -2.1 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2011); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 49.60.215, .040 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 106.52 (2012).
117. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557, 124 Stat.
119, 260 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18116(a) (2010)).
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administered by an Executive Agency or any entity
established under this title (or amendments).118
Therefore, to the extent that hospitals or physicians are subject
to the PPACA or state laws prohibiting discrimination in the
provision of health care, they would be violating the law if their
medical treatment of infants born with an intersex condition is
considered sex or disability discrimination.
A. Sex Discrimination
The PPACA and state laws prohibiting sex discrimination in the
provision of health care are similar to other statues that prohibit
discrimination because of “sex” in that they do not delineate acts that
constitute impermissible sex discrimination. Although hundreds of
federal, state, and local laws and regulations prohibit sex
discrimination in a number of settings,119 the meaning of the term
“sex” in these legislative acts is far from clear. Therefore, during the
last forty years, courts have been asked to determine exactly what
types of acts violate statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination.
When laws prohibiting sex discrimination were first adopted,
courts tended to rule that the purpose of the legislation was to
provide equal opportunities for women and men. The typical early
successful sex discrimination cases involved men or women who
were treated differently because of their biological sex. For example,
early decisions invalidated employer rules that provided only men
could be airline pilots and only women could be flight attendants.120
During the first three decades after sex discrimination
prohibitions were enacted in 1964, courts generally refused to
expand the meaning of the term “sex” beyond this simple approach.
Typically, the statutory ban against sex discrimination did not protect
people from discriminatory treatment based on their status as a man
or woman who failed to conform to gender role stereotypes,121 a

118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Education Amendment Act of 1972 tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006)
(prohibiting sex discrimination in education); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to e-17 (2006) (forbidding sex discrimination in employment).
120. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding
that Pan Am’s policy of hiring only females for flight attendant positions violated Title VII).
121. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 103 (2003)
(citing Chi v. Age Grp., Ltd., No. 94 CIV 5253 (AGS), 1996 WL 627580, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
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pregnant woman,122 a gay or lesbian person,123 or a transgender
person.124
Whether these statutes would prohibit discrimination against a
person with an intersex condition is also questionable. Wood v. C.G.
Studios, Inc.125 is the only reported case that has addressed
discrimination directed against a person based on her intersex
condition. In Wood, an employer terminated one of its employees
after learning that the employee “had undergone surgery to correct
her hermaphroditic condition.”126 The federal district court refused to
treat the employer’s actions as unlawful sex discrimination. The
court analyzed the history of the act and found that the purpose of the
legislation was to provide equal employment opportunities to
women. Consequently, the court determined that the statute was not
intended to remedy discrimination against individuals because they
had undergone gender-corrective surgery.127 The court limited the
meaning of the word “sex” in the statute to what it considered to be
the word’s “plain meaning,” and held that sex discrimination
prohibitions
do
not
encompass
discrimination
against
“hermaphrodites” because of their intersex status.128
These limited visions of the scope of sex discrimination
prohibitions began to dissolve in large part due to the feminist and

Oct. 29, 1996); Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997); Martinez v. N.B.C.
Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833
(SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular,
Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)).
122. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
123. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989);
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330–31 (9th Cir. 1979). A number of later cases
have followed this approach, including Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2000),
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 2000), and Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 1999).
124. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663–64 (9th Cir. 1977); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 285–86 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 84-3296,
1985 WL 9446, at *1–2 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985); Terry v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n,
Civ. A. No. 80-C-408, 1980 WL 334, at *1–3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1980); Powell v. Read’s, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 369, 370–71 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp.
456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Bernards Twp.
Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), aff’d mem., 538 F.2d 319
(3d Cir. 1976).
125. 660 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 176–78.
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LGBT movements and feminist and queer theorists, who helped to
educate society and the judiciary about the complex nature of sex
discrimination. These scholars and activists helped courts develop a
more nuanced understanding of the meaning and harm of sex
discrimination.
The major expansion of the meaning of the word “sex” and the
acts that encompass sex discrimination came from the Supreme
Court’s 1989 ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.129 In Price
Waterhouse, an accounting firm denied a partnership to
Ms. Hopkins, not because she was biologically a woman but because
she failed to meet the partners’ stereotyped expectations of how a
woman should behave. The partners implied that her failure to
conform to stereotypes of femininity blocked her path to partnership.
Specifically, Hopkins was told that she overcompensated for being a
woman and was too “macho.”130 She was advised to stop using
profanity, to take a class at charm school, and to “walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”131 The Supreme
Court ruled that discrimination against a woman because she failed
to conform to societal stereotypes of femininity constituted
discrimination based on “sex.”132
The Court’s acceptance of sex stereotyping as a form of
impermissible sex discrimination reflects a more sophisticated
understanding of the harms of sex-based discriminatory conduct.
Based on the Price Waterhouse decision, individuals who are treated
differently because they fail to conform to sex-related stereotypes
have been able to prove that they were subjected to impermissible
sex discrimination if they appropriately frame their claims as gender
nonconformity or sex stereotyping discrimination.
A number of courts have embraced the concept that gender role
performance, sexual orientation, and gender identity are part of a
person’s “sex.” These courts have prohibited discrimination against
people whose gender roles, gender behaviors, and gender identities
fail to conform to societal norms. This more nuanced understanding
of sex discrimination could form the basis for a claim that cosmetic
129.
130.
131.
132.

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 258.
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genital surgery performed on an infant with an intersex condition
constitutes discrimination because of “sex.”
1. Gender Role Performance
Many men and women suffer from discrimination when they opt
to fulfill roles that do not comport with societal stereotypes about
appropriate functions for males and females. Courts originally ruled
that sex discrimination statutes did not encompass discrimination
based on gender role stereotyping.133 Recently, however, some courts
have allowed recovery based on this theory.
For example, new mothers have recovered when they sued for
discrimination based on gender role performance stereotyping.134 In
these cases, employers discriminated against new mothers because
the employers believed that the new mothers would fail to conform
to the norm of the ideal worker. For example, in Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free School District,135 a school psychologist, Elena
Back, filed a sex stereotyping claim when she was denied tenure. Ms.
Back took a maternity leave after she gave birth. She returned to
work and was subsequently denied tenure. During the review
process, her supervisors made comments questioning her ability as a
new mother to devote herself to her job. The court held that these
statements were evidence of impermissible sex stereotyping
discrimination because they indicated a presumption that being a
mother is incompatible with being an effective worker.136
Similarly, some courts have granted recovery to men who
suffered discrimination because they failed to conform to the norm of
a male breadwinner when they sought time off for family care
responsibilities.137 For example, in Knussman v. Maryland,138
Maryland State Trooper Howard Kevin Knussman alleged that he
suffered sex discrimination when his employer refused to grant him
paid leave to care for his wife and newborn child. His wife suffered
133. See Williams & Segal, supra note 121, at 123–30.
134. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir.
2004); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000);
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that discrimination
against new mothers based on assumptions about the employees’ ability to be both mothers and
good workers constitutes impermissible sex stereotyping).
135. 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 120.
137. E.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
138. Id.
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from medical problems during the pregnancy and after the birth.
Knussman sought paid leave under a gender-neutral statute granting
“nurturing leave” for the care of a newborn. The court ruled that the
employer engaged in unlawful sex discrimination when it denied
paid leave to Mr. Knussman. The court ruled that the employer’s
decision was based on stereotypes about the proper roles for men and
women.139
2. Gender Behavior
Gays and lesbians, who before Price Waterhouse consistently
lost their sex discrimination claims, are now sometimes successful in
convincing courts that they were victims of sex discrimination when
they were harassed or otherwise discriminated against because they
failed to conform to sex and gender norms.140
For example, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.,141 Medina
Rene, an openly gay male butler at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las
Vegas, was able to prove that other butlers had engaged in
impermissible sex discrimination. All the other butlers, including
Rene’s supervisor, were male. Rene testified that during a two-year
period at the MGM Grand, he had been continuously subjected to
harassment by his supervisor and fellow butlers. The harassers
whistled and blew kisses at Rene; they called him “sweetheart” and
“muñeca” (Spanish for “doll”); they gave him sexually oriented
“joke” gifts; and they forced him to look at pictures of naked men
having sex. He was also subjected to physical harassment of a sexual
nature. Rene stated that the other employees would treat him as they
would treat a woman because they knew he was gay. The court held
that the fact that he was treated “like a woman” constitutes ample
evidence of impermissible gender stereotyping.142

139. Id. at 636.
140. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F. 3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001);
Schmedding v. Tnemec Co. Inc., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999). A number of courts continue to
deny recovery to gays and lesbians if the employees allege they were harassed because of their
sexual orientation. See, e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701,
704 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999); Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97 C 8342, 2000 WL 336528 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Mims
v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
141. 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 1069.
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Similarly, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,143
Antonio Sanchez, a male waiter, alleged that he had been subjected
to an unrelenting barrage of verbal abuse because he was perceived
as being insufficiently masculine. He was called sexually derogatory
names, referred to in the female gender, and taunted for behaving
like a woman. The court applied the Price Waterhouse gender
stereotyping theory and concluded that harassment generated by a
person’s failure to conform to male stereotypical behavior constitutes
impermissible sex discrimination.144
3. Gender Identity
Before the decision in Price Waterhouse, transgender plaintiffs
consistently lost their cases when they tried to state a claim for sex
discrimination. Early courts ruled that discrimination against people
whose gender identity did not conform to the sex assigned to them at
birth was not prohibited under sex discrimination statutes.145 Since
Price Waterhouse, however, a number of courts have held that
discrimination against transgender people because their gender
identity fails to conform to their natal sex constitutes impermissible
sex discrimination.146
In Smith v. City of Salem,147 firefighting lieutenant, Jimmie
Smith, had worked for seven years in the Salem Fire Department
without any negative incidents. After Lieutenant Smith began his
transition to becoming a woman, his coworkers began questioning
him about his appearance and commenting that his looks and
mannerisms were not “masculine enough.”148 Smith decided to
notify his supervisor that he was in the process of transitioning and
143. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
144. Id. at 874–75.
145. See supra note 124.
146. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. City of
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir.
2004); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). The
EEOC also adopted this approach in Macy. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821
(2012), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/cms/blogs/552-24#ruling. The EEOC concluded that
“discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by
definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”
Id. at 14. The sex stereotyping theory has not been universally accepted in all cases involving
transgender plaintiffs. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
147. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
148. Id. at 568.
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he would eventually undergo a complete physical transformation and
become a woman. After he disclosed his transgender status, his
employer instituted a plan to fire him.149 The court held that the fire
department discriminated against Smith based on the Price
Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory because the treatment was based
on Smith’s failure to conform to gender norms of how men should
look and behave. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the earlier cases that
had denied the ability of transgender people to recover for sex
discrimination were “eviscerated” by the 1989 holding in Price
Waterhouse.150 The Sixth Circuit reinforced this approach one year
later in Barnes v. Cincinnati.151
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s
approach. In Glenn v. Brumby,152 the appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a transgender
plaintiff who brought an equal protection sex discrimination claim.
Vandiver Glenn sued for sex discrimination when the Georgia
General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel fired her from her
editorial position after she notified her supervisor that she identified
as a woman and was beginning her transition to living and presenting
as a female. Her employer, Sewell Brumby, stated that her
appearance was inappropriate, and he found it “unsettling to think of
someone dressed in women’s clothing with male sexual organs
inside that clothing,” and “that a male in women’s clothing is
‘unnatural.’”153 When he fired her, he stated that her “intended
gender transition was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that
some people would view it as a moral issue, and that it would make
Glenn’s coworkers uncomfortable.”154 The Eleventh Circuit ruled
that discrimination against people because of their transgender status
constitutes impermissible sex discrimination because the
discrimination is based on their failure to conform to gender
stereotypes.155
A number of other circuit courts have reached similar
conclusions under other statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. For
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 573.
401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
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example, in Schwenk v. Hartford,156 the Ninth Circuit ruled that
discrimination against a transgender plaintiff because she failed to
act like a man constituted impermissible sex discrimination under the
Gender Motivated Violence Act. The First Circuit adopted a similar
approach when it determined that refusing a loan to a transgender
plaintiff because she failed to dress in accordance with prescribed
gender roles violated the prohibition against sex discrimination in the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.157 A number of district courts have
also ruled that transgender plaintiffs who suffer differential treatment
because of their failure to comply with stereotypical gender norms
have been subjected to impermissible sex discrimination.158
The ability of transgender people to recover under a sex
discrimination theory expanded dramatically after the 2008 federal
district court ruling in Schroer v. Billington.159 Diane Schroer, a
male-to-female transsexual, applied for a position with the research
division of the Library of Congress as a terrorism specialist
providing expert policy analysis to Congress. When she applied for
the job, she had not yet transitioned so she used her legal male name,
David, on the application and she attended the interview in male
clothing. She received the highest score of the eighteen candidates
and she was offered the job. Diane accepted the position, but before
she began work, she notified the person in charge of hiring that she
would begin work as a female. The job offer was revoked and Diane
sued.
The court found that the Library of Congress had engaged in
unlawful sex discrimination for two reasons. First, the court found
that Diane was denied the job based on the sex stereotyping theory
developed in Price Waterhouse. The court concluded that different
comments by the employer indicated that Diane was viewed as “an
insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or
an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual.”160 The court
156. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
157. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000).
158. See, e.g., Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653,
659–61 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. 05-243, 2006 WL 986971 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 21, 2006); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL
2008954 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004), aff’d, 325 F. App’x. 492 (9th Cir. 2009); Tronetti v. TLC
Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03–CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
2003).
159. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
160. Id. at 305.
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stated: “[T]he Library was enthusiastic about hiring David Schroer—
until she disclosed her transsexuality. The Library revoked the offer
when it learned that a man named David intended to become, legally,
culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane. This was
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”161
More important, the court found that, in addition to stating a sex
stereotyping discrimination claim, Schroer could recover under a
straightforward sex discrimination theory and did not need to rely on
the stereotyping approach. The court ruled that people who “change”
their sex and suffer discrimination because of the transition have
suffered sex discrimination. The court continued:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts
from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer
testifies that he harbors no bias toward either Christians or
Jews but only “converts.” That would be a clear case of
discrimination “because of religion.” No court would take
seriously the notion that “converts” are not covered by the
statute. Discrimination “because of religion” easily
encompasses discrimination because of a change of
religion. But in cases where the plaintiff has changed her
sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision to stop
presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman,
courts have traditionally carved such persons out of the
statute by concluding that “transsexuality” is unprotected by
Title VII. In other words, courts have allowed their focus on
the label “transsexual” to blind them to the statutory
language itself.162
The holding of the Schroer court calls into serious question the
continuing validity of the single employment discrimination case
involving an employee with an intersex condition.163 In 1987, a
district court held that Wilma Wood had not been subjected to sex
discrimination when her employer fired her after learning about her
intersex condition.164 The court reasoned that sex discrimination
prohibitions were designed to provide equal employment
opportunities to women and were not meant to protect women who
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 306–07.
Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
Id. at 177–78.
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had undergone gender corrective surgery. The holding in Wood is
consistent with the understanding of the scope of sex discrimination
prohibitions during the 1980s. All the cases at that time narrowly
construed the reach of statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. Just as
Price Waterhouse eviscerated the holdings in earlier sex
discrimination cases brought by gay, lesbian, transgender, and other
gender nonconforming people, it should be interpreted to eviscerate
the holding in Wood. Discrimination against people with an intersex
condition should be treated similarly to the treatment of transgender
people in the Schroer decision. If discrimination against transgender
people who have transitioned from one sex to the other constitutes
impermissible sex discrimination, people who have been
discriminated against based on their DSD status also have been
subjected to unlawful sex discrimination.
4. Applying Sex Discrimination Principles
to the Medical Treatment of Infants with a DSD
Now that courts recognize that statutory prohibitions against sex
discrimination protect people from discrimination based on sex and
gender stereotypes, a sex discrimination framework could be an
effective tool for challenging cosmetic genital surgeries and other
medical protocols performed on infants with an intersex condition. If
infants with a DSD are subjected to differential treatment because
they fail to conform to stereotypical sex norms, the differential
treatment could be considered impermissible sex discrimination.
Therefore, the question that must be asked is why are children
with a DSD being subjected to these procedures? Four current
treatment protocols are based at least in part on sex and/or gender
stereotypes:
a. Surgeries to reduce the size of a girl’s clitoris;
b. Dexamethasone administration to pregnant women
carrying children who are at risk of having congenital
adrenal hyperplasia;
c. Surgeries to create a vagina in girls who are born with no
vagina or a shortened vaginal canal; and
d. Surgeries to move the urethral opening to the tip of a
boy’s penis.
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a. Surgeries to reduce the size of the clitoris
Many physicians treating infants with an intersex condition
believe that children who will be raised as girls should not have a
larger-than-average clitoris. If doctors believe a girl’s clitoris is too
large, they will recommend that the infant undergo clitoral reduction
surgery. The basis for this recommendation is the unproven
assumption that clitoral reduction surgery will enhance the girl’s
psychological well-being. Although no studies have proven the
benefit of these procedures, these surgeries often lead to a number of
serious problems. They may make it difficult or impossible for a
woman to experience an orgasm. They may also cause infection,
scarring, incontinence, and other severe physical complications.
Many medical experts, scholars, and people who have been subjected
to these surgeries assert that these medical procedures often cause
stigma, psychological trauma, and lifelong physical complications,
without proof of any benefit to the child.165
Why would parents consent to surgeries with these risks? One
study indicates that parents prioritize genital appearance over erotic
responsiveness. A study asked parents of children born with an
intersex condition to rank the importance of sexual responsiveness
and genital appearance. Ninety-five percent of the parents indicated
that they would have authorized genital surgery, even if a reduction
in sexual responsiveness was certain.166 In other words, doctors
recommend and parents consent to these surgeries based on the
gender stereotype that females care more about their genital
appearance than they do about their ability to engage in satisfactory
sex.167
This assumption is not only a gender stereotype; based on a
study of female college students, it also appears to be a false gender
stereotype. A group of female college students was asked to imagine

165. See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 42; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
166. Jennifer E. Dayner et al., Medical Treatment of Intersex: Parental Perspectives, 172 J.
UROLOGY 1762, 1764–65 (2004).
167. Prioritizing conformity to cultural norms should not be used to justify a surgery that is
not desired by the person undergoing the treatment. For an excellent comparison of the
similarities between the cultural norms underlying female genital cutting as it is practiced in nonwestern societies and genital cutting of infants with an intersex condition that is performed in
western nations, see Nancy Ehrenreich with Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital
Cutting, and the Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
71 (2005).
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that they had been born with a clitoris larger than one centimeter at
birth.168 An overwhelming 93 percent of the students reported that
they would not have wanted their parents to agree to surgery to alter
the appearance of their genitalia if it resulted in the loss of orgasm or
pleasurable sensitivity. More than 50 percent of the women would
not have wanted surgery even if the condition was unattractive and
made them feel uncomfortable. The students were more likely to
want surgery to reduce a large nose, ears, or breasts than surgery to
reduce an enlarged clitoris. This result is consistent with the
women’s ratings of the importance of genital sensation and capacity
to orgasm, which they ranked as very important as compared to the
size of the clitoris, which was ranked as only somewhat important.169
Therefore, surgeries being performed based on the false gender
stereotype that women emphasize genital appearance over erotic
response could be viewed as a form of impermissible sex
stereotyping discrimination.
b. Dexamethasone administration to pregnant women carrying
children who are at risk of having congenital adrenal hyperplasia
Surgical interventions are not the only technique doctors have
relied on to produce “acceptable” female genitalia. Some doctors
have also experimented with other methods to alter the genitalia of
infants with an intersex condition. For example, instead of
performing surgery after the child is born, some doctors administer
drugs to pregnant mothers who may be carrying a child with one type
of DSD, 21-hydroxylase deficiency CAH, which is an adrenal
disorder that can lead to the formation of atypical genitalia.170
An XX fetus with CAH has adrenal glands that produce high
levels of androgens, which are masculinizing hormones. Depending
on the level of exposure, these children may be born with genitalia
that have been partially masculinized. Some doctors are
administering dexamethasone to pregnant women who are at risk of
carrying an XX child with CAH because this drug may be effective
in stopping the masculinization of the genitalia.171

168. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 101.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Nimkarn & New, supra note 54, at 53.
171. Id. at 53, 56; Catherine Elton, A Prenatal Treatment Raises Questions of Medical Ethics,
TIME, (June 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1996453,00.html.
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This practice is problematic because it can cause significant
harm to the fetus. Prenatal exposure to dexamethasone has been
shown to cause brain changes.172 Children who have been exposed
have displayed problems with working memory, verbal processing,
and anxiety.173
Administering this drug is also problematic because it exposes
fetuses that will not be negatively affected by CAH to these dangers.
To prevent masculinization of the genitalia, dexamethasone must be
administered early in the pregnancy at approximately the sixth or
seventh week of gestation.174 At this point in the pregnancy, doctors
are not able to determine whether the fetus is XX or XY or whether
the fetus has CAH.175 XY infants, with or without CAH, and XX
infants who do not have CAH need not be exposed to this drug. The
only purpose for administering the drug is to prevent virilization in
XX infants who also have CAH.176 A mother who has given birth to
a child with CAH has a one-in-eight chance of carrying an XX fetus
with CAH.177 Therefore, the vast majority of fetuses exposed to
dexamethasone have no reason to be exposed to the drug because it
will provide absolutely no benefit. Dexamethasone could potentially
provide a benefit to approximately 10 percent of the fetuses being
exposed to it by preventing the development of masculinized
genitalia in an XX fetus, but the goal of producing cosmetically
acceptable genitalia is being sought at the expense of creating a
significant risk of harm to the 90 percent of the fetuses that will
receive absolutely no benefit.

172. Noel P. French et al., Repeated Antenatal Corticosteroids: Effects on Cerebral Palsy and
Childhood Behavior, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 588, 591–92 (2004).
173. See, e.g., Tatja Hirvikoski et al., Cognitive Functions in Children at Risk for Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia Treated Prenatally with Dexamethasone, 92 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY
& METABOLISM 542, 544–47 (2007).
174. Svetlana Lajic et al., Prenatal Treatment of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, 151 EUR.
J. ENDOCRINOLOGY U63, U64 (2004).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. If a woman has given birth to a CAH child and she conceives another child with the
same father, only one in eight pregnancies will be a female fetus with CAH who might be helped
by the treatment. Four of the eight fetuses will be male and three of the eight fetuses will be
unaffected females.
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In 2010, a group of experts convened to review clinical practice
guidelines for the treatment of CAH.178 They decided that the
administration of dexamethasone to pregnant women should be
considered experimental.179 They recommended that this treatment
should be pursued only through “protocols approved by Institutional
Review Boards at centers capable of collecting outcomes data on a
sufficiently large number of patients so that risks and benefits of this
treatment can be defined more precisely.”180
Diminishing the size of the clitoris is not the only benefit that
physicians claim this drug could accomplish. Researchers have also
noted that this drug may enhance feminine thinking and behavior in
an XX fetus with CAH.181 Women with CAH have a higher
likelihood of being bisexual or lesbian, and often display behavior
that is considered “tomboyish.”182 Some researchers have implied
that administration of dexamethasone to pregnant women may solve
this “problem.” One study reported:
CAH women as a group have a lower interest than controls
in getting married and performing the traditional childcare/housewife role. As children, they show an unusually
low interest in engaging in maternal play with baby dolls,
and their interest in caring for infants, the frequency of
daydreams or fantasies of pregnancy and motherhood, or
the expressed wish of experiencing pregnancy and having
children of their own appear to be relatively low in all age
groups.
....
. . . Long term follow-up studies of the behavioral outcome
will show whether dexamethasone treatment also prevents
the effects of prenatal androgens on brain and
behavior. . . .183

178. Phyllis W. Speiser et al., Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia Due to Steroid 21Hydroxylase Deficiency: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, 95 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 4133, 4137 (2010).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, What Causes Low Rates of Childbearing in Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia?, 84 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 1844, 1845–46 (1999).
182. Id.
183. Id. (citations omitted). For a thorough critique of the use of dexamethasone, see Alice
Dreger et al., Preventing Homosexuality (and Uppity Women) in the Womb?, BIOETHICS FORUM
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In other words, some doctors are suggesting that they could be
improving girls’ lives by enhancing the likelihood that they will want
to fulfill the traditional female roles of housewife and mother. A
treatment that carries significant risk to unaffected fetuses, as well as
an XX fetus carrying CAH, that is designed to feminize the genitalia
and potentially turn “tomboyish” girls into females who fantasize
about becoming wives and mothers supports the argument that this
health care protocol is based on gender stereotypes.
c. Surgeries to create a vagina
Some DSDs may result in a girl being born without a vagina or
with a vaginal canal that is shortened.184 Doctors will perform
surgeries on these girls to create a vagina or to expand the shortened
vagina. Females require a vagina for menstrual flow, giving birth,
and engaging in traditional heterosexual intercourse. Some women
with an intersex condition do not menstruate and cannot bear
children, so the only reason for them to have a vagina created is to
allow them to engage in heterosexual intercourse.185 Although
infants and young children do not have any use for a vagina, until
recently, physicians typically performed these surgeries on infants
based on the unsupported assumption that performing these surgeries
while the child is too young to understand the significance is less
psychologically traumatic.186 These surgeries often require parents to
dilate the vagina to maintain its size.187
The 2006 Consensus Statement recommends that these surgeries
be postponed until adolescence.188 Some physicians, however, still
recommend that the vaginoplasty be performed in some
circumstances when the child is still an infant.189

BLOG (June 29, 2010, 6:17 PM), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=
4754&blogid=140.
184. Sarah Creighton, Surgery for Intersex, 94 J. FOR ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 218, 219 (2001).
For example, girls with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome or congenital adrenal
hyperplasia may have a normal vagina, a shortened vagina, or no vagina.
185. Id. For example, girls with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome do not have a
uterus and ovaries. Therefore, they do not menstruate and they cannot bear children.
186. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 49; Speiser, supra note 178, at 4143.
187. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 49.
188. Lee et al., supra note 13, at e492.
189. Speiser, supra note 178, at 4143 (acknowledging that systematic long-term evaluation of
the benefits and risks of early as opposed to later surgery do not exist).
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The need to create a vagina in a girl who will not menstruate or
bear children is based on the assumption that all females will desire a
vagina so that they will be able to engage in sexual intercourse with a
man. When parents consent to these surgeries, they may not be
making the decision that their children would want. The same survey
that asked female students whether they would have wanted their
parents to consent to clitoral reduction surgery questioned women
about whether they would have wanted their parents to consent to
vaginoplasty.190 Most of them would not have wanted vaginal
surgery, even if the condition made them feel uncomfortable or
limited their ability to engage in sexual intercourse.191 The women
surveyed believed that the impact of not having a vagina during
childhood would not have affected their self-esteem.192
Therefore, creating a vagina in a female for the sole purpose of
facilitating intercourse with a man is based on the false gender
stereotype that all women will desire heterosexual intercourse. It also
perpetuates the vision of women as passive recipients of men’s
sexual desires.193 Not all women will want to engage in heterosexual
intercourse, and those who have this desire can consent to the
surgery when they decide to become sexually active. Creating a
vagina in girls who will not menstruate or bear children and who
may never desire a vagina for sexual intercourse with a man supports
a finding that these medical procedures are based on gender
stereotypes.
d. Surgeries to move the urethral opening
to the tip of a boy’s penis
A common congenital condition, hypospadias, occurs in
approximately 1 in 200–300 live births.194 In males with
hypospadias, the urethral opening is located somewhere along the
underside of the penis rather than at its tip. In the vast majority of
cases, there is no medical reason to move the urethral opening.
Typically, however, male infants are subjected to surgeries to move

190. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 102.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Ehrenreich, supra note 167, at 125.
194. Laurence S. Baskin & Michele B. Ebbers, Hypospadias: Anatomy, Etiology, and
Technique, 41 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 463 (2006).
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the urethral opening to the end of the penis. Doctors recommend that
these surgeries be performed when the boys are six months old.
Although these surgeries could be delayed until the males reach the
age of consent and could decide for themselves whether to undergo
this procedure, they are performed in infancy based on the unproven
assumption that boys growing up with an atypical penis will suffer
emotional trauma.195
Although some boys require only one surgery, many males with
hypospadias have been subjected to multiple invasive surgeries.
These procedures have resulted in physical scarring, poor cosmetic
results, and difficulty in urinating,196 without proof that they are
beneficial.
When males were surveyed about whether they would have
wanted their parents to consent to surgery if their urethral opening
was off center, one-third of the men reported that they would not
have wanted their parents to consent even if it meant that they would
not have been able to urinate in a standing position.197 Three-fourths
of them would have rejected the surgery if it resulted in the loss of
pleasurable sensitivity.198
Just as young girls with atypical genitalia are subjected to
invasive cosmetic genital surgeries to conform their bodies to a
feminine norm, infant boys with hypospadias are subjected to
surgeries that have no medical justification solely to bring their
bodies into conformity with stereotypical notions of masculinity. As
one commentator wrote, “[B]oys who cannot urinate in what is
referred to as the ‘male’ manner are said not to be able to
‘demonstrat[e] their prowess at urinating at certain distances in
competition with other boys . . . which could lead to competence
anxieties related to their penis.”199
Intersex advocates believe that these four medical procedures
should no longer be performed on infants with a DSD. No studies
prove that they are clearly beneficial and evidence exists that they
may lead to serious physical and psychological trauma. Current

195. Id. at 467.
196. Id. at 466.
197. KESSLER, supra note 26, at 102.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 70 (quoting Mark Mureau et al., Genital Perception of Children, Adolescents, and
Adults Operated on for Hypospadias: A Comparative Study, 32 J. SEX RES. 289, 290 (1995)).
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treatment protocols for infants with an intersex condition (1)
prioritize cosmetic appearance over the ability to orgasm for women;
(2) are assumed to be beneficial because they may enhance the
likelihood of “feminine” desires in girls; (3) are based on the
presumption that all women will want to engage in heterosexual
intercourse; or (4) are performed on the assumption that boys who
cannot urinate in a standing position are not sufficiently masculine.
To the extent that these procedures are performed for these reasons,
the treatment decisions are based on sex and gender stereotypes
about manhood and womanhood. If physicians and hospitals
recommend these procedures because they decide that a child is not
sufficiently masculine or feminine, they are arguably engaging in a
form of sex discrimination.
B. Disability Discrimination
The current medical protocol for the treatment of infants with a
DSD could also be considered a form of disability discrimination.
Disability discrimination is prohibited under a number of federal and
state laws.
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
The ADA provides the primary avenue in the United States for
pursuing a disability claim.200 This federal law prohibits
discrimination against a person with a disability in a number of areas,
including the provision of health services.201
Thus far, no one with an intersex condition has brought a claim
under the ADA or other disability statutes. These statutes may
provide a means to limit surgical alterations of infants with an
intersex condition and eliminate the stigma associated with such
conditions.
Section 12102(2) of the ADA provides the basic ADA rules.
This section defines disability as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or

200. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
201. Id. §§ 12132, 12182.
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(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.202
Some intersex conditions create medical risks that qualify as an
actual impairment under § 12102(2)(A). For example, people with an
intersex condition that impairs the endocrine and bladder functions
or results in infertility meet the definition of having a physical
impairment under this section.203 Most people with an intersex
condition, however, are not impaired. They are able to live full,
productive lives without medical intervention.
Although most people with a DSD are not actually impaired,
they could still be covered under § 12102(2)(C) of the ADA if they
are subjected to medical procedures because they are “regarded as
having such an impairment.”204 Therefore, the reasons underlying the
current medical protocol for infants with a DSD must be analyzed to
determine whether they are based on the perception that people with
a DSD are impaired.
Doctors perform cosmetic genital surgery on infants with an
intersex condition because they believe that people with a DSD will
suffer psychological harm as children and as adults. They think that
children who grow up with genitalia that look different from their
peers’ genitalia will suffer emotional trauma. They also believe that
adults with atypical genitalia will face obstacles in forming romantic
relationships or engaging in reproductive or other sexual acts. These
surgeries are not performed because adults with a DSD are actually
impaired in their ability to form romantic and other relationships.
Many adults with atypical genitalia who have not been subjected to
surgical intervention were well-adjusted children and have formed
meaningful long-term romantic and sexual relationships.205
Therefore, these life-altering surgeries are performed because people
with DSDs are perceived as being impaired. This differential
treatment appears to meet the requirements of § 12102(2)(C).

202. Id. § 12102(2).
203. Id. § 12102(2)(A). This Article focuses on whether people with a DSD could state a
disability claim based on the perception that they are disabled. For a more thorough analysis of
whether specific DSDs could qualify as an actual impairment under § 12102(2)(A), see Yamuna
Menon, The Intersex Community and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1221, 1238–40 (2011).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
205. See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 42, at 77.
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The ADA also requires that the impairment or perceived
impairment limit a major life activity.206 Under the ADA, major life
activities include operations of major bodily functions, including but
not limited to functions of the bladder, the endocrine system, and the
reproductive system. Therefore, people with an intersex condition
that affects these functions meet the requirement of a limitation of a
major life activity.
People with a DSD that does not affect these functions are
unlikely to be limited from participating in any major life activities.
Therefore, they would not meet the requirements of
§ 12102(2)(A).207 They could still meet the ADA’s requirements
under § 12102(3), which provides that for purposes of
§ 12102(2)(C):
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as
having such an impairment” if the individual establishes
that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited
under this chapter because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.208
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
interpreted § 12102(3) to include individuals who are subjected to
differential treatment because of the perceptions of others. The
EEOC publication provides:
(d) Persons Who Are Substantially Limited as a Result of
Others’ Attitudes—This subpart covers individuals who
have stigmatic conditions that constitute physical or mental
impairments but that do not by themselves substantially
limit a major life activity. The impairments become
substantially limiting only because of the negative reactions
of others toward the impairments. For example, a person
who has experienced severe burns may have an impairment
that is substantially limiting solely because of the attitudes
of others. Similarly, a person who has a cosmetic
disfigurement may be continuously refused employment

206. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
207. See id.
208. Id. § 12102(3).
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because of employers’ fears about the negative reactions of
co-workers or clients. These persons would be covered
under the third part of the definition of the term
“disability.”209
Infants with an intersex condition frequently are subjected to
medically unnecessary cosmetic surgeries that may impair their
ability to engage in satisfactory sex, affect continence, render them
infertile, and inflict severe psychological trauma. These surgeries,
which have not been proven to be beneficial, are being performed on
healthy children with an intersex condition even though procedures
that pose the same risks would not be performed on children who do
not have an intersex condition. Therefore, one could argue that
subjecting these children to potentially disabling invasive surgeries
because they are “perceived as being impaired” constitutes disability
discrimination.
2. State Disability Laws
In addition to federal disability laws, disability claims could also
be based on violations of state laws. The recent report published by
the WPAS involving the treatment of “Ashley X”210 provides a
potential basis to bring a claim on behalf of children with an intersex
condition.211 Ashley was born with profound developmental
disabilities. Doctors predicted that her mental capacity would never
develop beyond that of an infant. At the age of six, Ashley could not
sit up, ambulate, or use speech. She was dependent on a gastronomy
tube for her nutrition. Despite her disabilities, Ashley was an integral
member of the family and her parents wanted to continue caring for
her at home; they did not want her care to be put in the hands of
strangers.212
When Ashley began to display signs of early puberty, her
parents became concerned that they would not be able to care for her
209. Section 902 Definition of the Term Disability, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html#902.8d (discussing
§ 902.8(d)).
210. See CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88.
211. Ashley X did not have an intersex condition; she was born with profound developmental
disabilities. The reasoning that the WPAS applied to a child with developmental disabilities,
however, could apply with equal force to a child born with an intersex condition.
212. Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with
Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1013 (2006).
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as she continued to grow and mature. Ashley’s parents and doctors
developed a plan to stunt Ashley’s growth and to repress her sexual
development by having doctors perform a hysterectomy to prevent
menstruation and a mastectomy to prevent development of breast
tissue. They also planned to administer estrogen to prevent her from
reaching her projected adult height and weight. The goals of these
treatments were to allow Ashley’s parents to continue her home care
and to avoid potential complications of early puberty.213
Because of the extensive nature of the planned intervention,
Ashley’s physicians sought guidance from the hospital ethics
committee. The committee approved the proposed treatment and
advised the parents to obtain legal advice regarding the procedures
that would lead to sterility. The parents hired an attorney to advise
them about whether they required a court order before they could
initiate the procedures. Their attorney advised them that they did not
need a court order, so they proceeded without one.214
When news about Ashley’s treatment became public, disability
rights groups protested.215 They argued that the motivation for the
treatment may have been to benefit Ashley’s parents, rather than
Ashley. They also argued that the treatment was dehumanizing.216
Ashley’s treatment was subsequently investigated by the WPAS,
the federally mandated protection and advocacy agency for the state
of Washington. The WPAS has legal authority under federal law to
investigate allegations of mistreatment of persons with a disability
within the state of Washington. The WPAS determined that Ashley’s
treatment violated her constitutional and common law rights and was
a direct violation of Washington law. The agency ruled that parents
and doctors cannot agree to sterilize children without a court order
determining that the sterilization is in the child’s best interest.217 The
court proceeding must be adversarial and the child’s interests must
be zealously represented by a disinterested third party.218
213. See id.
214. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 14.
215. See Dave Reynolds, Advocates Speak Out and Call For Investigations over “Ashley
Treatment,” INCLUSION DAILY EXPRESS (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.inclusiondaily.com/
archives/07/01/12/011207waashleyx.htm.
216. See id.; William Peace, The Ashley Treatment and the Making of a Pillow Angel: Protest
from a Bad Cripple, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.counterpunch.org/peace
01182007.html.
217. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 88, at 1.
218. Id. at 19.
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The WPAS did not limit its holding to the procedures that
resulted in sterilization. It also held that Ashley’s constitutional
liberty and privacy rights were affected by any procedures that were
invasive and irreversible.219 Therefore, the WPAS determined that
the removal of Ashley’s breast buds and the administration of high
doses of hormones also implicated her constitutional rights to liberty
and privacy and should be subjected to court review.220
Parental consent to cosmetic genital surgery performed on
infants with a DSD involves issues similar to those that were raised
in Ashley X’s case. Ashley’s parents and parents of children with a
DSD who are faced with the difficult decision about whether to have
their children undergo surgical alteration are clearly motivated by
love and their desire to act in the best interests of their children. The
procedures performed on Ashley X and infants with a DSD,
however, are different from other life-altering decisions that parents
make for their children. In cases involving profoundly disabled
children and infants with a DSD, parents have limited information
about the benefits and risks of the proposed procedures and may
have difficulty separating their interests from their child’s best
interest. In addition, some of these surgeries have the potential to
infringe on constitutionally protected liberty and privacy rights.
Therefore, before these procedures are performed, they should be
subjected to additional review by a court and/or hospital ethics
committee. Such a review can guarantee that all the relevant
information is considered and that safeguards are followed to ensure
that the best interests of the child undergoing the procedure are
paramount.221
Arguably, surgeries performed on infants with an intersex
condition should be subjected to even greater scrutiny than are the
treatments performed on children with developmental disabilities
because eventually children with a DSD will mature and will be able
to make these decisions for themselves. A person with
developmental disabilities as severe as Ashley’s will never be able to
219. Id. at 22.
220. Id. at 24–25.
221. For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of adopting various review approaches
when the issue involves growth attenuation of profoundly disabled children, see Benjamin S.
Wilfond et al., Navigating Growth Attenuation in Children with Profound Disabilities: Children’s
Interests, Family Decision-Making, and Community Concerns, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–
Dec. 2010, at 27.
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understand and consent to the treatment administered. She will
always require her parents’ care and she will never be in a position to
make these decisions for herself. In contrast, children with an
intersex condition will eventually reach an age when they are able to
provide their own informed consent. Therefore, performing highly
invasive and potentially life-altering surgeries on infants with an
intersex condition on the basis of parental consent alone is less
justifiable. Given the fact that children with an intersex condition
will eventually be able to make this decision on their own, a stronger
argument exists for nonintervention during infancy.
3. Reaction of the Intersex Community
to Use of a Disability Framework
Although disability discrimination statutes might prove to be a
productive avenue for intersex advocates who want to limit or end
infant cosmetic genital surgeries, many people with an intersex
condition object to the use of a disability framework. A recent
transition in the terminology used in this area illustrates this unease.
Most physicians and some intersex activists have rejected the term
“intersex” in favor of the term “Disorders of Sex Development.” 222
Although DSD is becoming the norm in many medical publications,
this change in terminology has not been met with universal support.
Some activists reject the use of the term “disorder” because of
the stigma that some in our society associate with people who are
disabled or disordered.223 Some prefer that the “D” in DSD represent
“difference” rather than “disorder,” while others have advocated for
the use of VRD to represent “variations of reproductive
development” because these terms avoid the stigmatization
associated with the word “disorder.”224

222. Holmes, supra note 3, at 2–5.
223. Organisation Intersex International (OII) is critical of the term “DSD” because it
increases medical pathologization and stigma associated with the term “disorder.” Curtis E.
Hinkle, Why Is OII Not Using the Term DSD or “Disorders of Sexual Development”?, OII,
http://www.intersexualite.org/Response_to_Intersex_Initiative.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
For a more detailed discussion of the debates regarding terminology, see GREENBERG, supra
note 2, at 118–19; Holmes, supra note 3, at 6–7; and Spurgas, supra note 14, at 97–111.
224. See, e.g., Margaret Simmonds, Comments on Consensus Statement on Management of
Intersex Disorders, ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD (Aug. 17, 2006), http://adc.bmj.com/
content/91/7/554/reply; see also Wiesemann et al., supra note 71, at 671 & n.1, 672 (choosing to
use the term “difference”).
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This aversion to the term “disorder” stems from the twentiethcentury medical model under which people with disabilities tend to
evoke pity. Opponents of the DSD terminology fear that the label
“disorder” will result in people with a DSD being viewed as not fully
functional.225 They are concerned that the societal response will be to
“cure” their disorder by medically modifying their bodies and
rehabilitating them so that they can become as “normal” as
possible.226 Opponents of the term “DSD” fear that the label will
perpetuate stigma and social prejudice because some people view
those with disabilities as inferior to those who are “normal.”227
Disability rights groups using critical disability theory have
challenged such frameworks. Instead of focusing on the individual
who is different, critical disability theorists focus on the barriers that
society has created to block the full participation of people with
disabilities.228 Under this view, disabilities are only impairments if
society is not structured so that those with disabilities are able to
participate fully.229 The classic example used to illustrate this
alternative vision is a person in a wheelchair. Those who cannot walk
are unable to participate fully in a society that provides only stairs
and escalators and not ramps and elevators. In a world in which all
buildings are accessible to those in wheelchairs, those who cannot
walk are not disabled from full participation. By shifting the focus
away from the bodies of disabled people and onto societal structures
that inhibit full participation, critical disability theorists argue that
body differences can become no more significant than hair or eye
color.230
Most people with an intersex condition are able to participate
fully in society and do not consider themselves disabled or
225. See, e.g., Elizabeth Reis, Divergence or Disorder?: The Politics of Intersex, 50 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 535, 535 (2007) (arguing that using the term “disorder” is problematic because
it implies medical conditions in need of repair, when some intersex anatomies, though atypical,
do not necessarily need surgical or hormonal correction).
226. See, e.g., Emi Koyama, Frequently Asked Questions About the “DSD” Controversy,
INTERSEX INITIATIVE (June 29, 2008), http://www.ipdx.org/articles/dsdfaq.html.
227. See id.
228. See Richard Devlin & Dianne Pothier, Introduction: Toward a Critical Theory of DisCitizenship, in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY, AND
LAW 1–2 (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds., 2006).
229. See id.
230. See id.; Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender
People Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006);
Ehrenreich et al., supra note 167, at 116–20.
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disordered. Critical disability theorists assert that social institutions
that use bright-line tests to distinguish male bodies from female
bodies and that view all bodies that do not meet these binary tests as
abnormal create the disability. The societal disposition to divide
bodies into normal and abnormal and to privilege some types of
bodies over others renders people with an intersex condition
“disabled.” As intersex activist Esther Morris has written, “Being
born without a vagina was not my problem. Having to get one was
the real problem.”231
Although some intersex activists oppose the use of a disability
model, disability laws can be effective tools in the fight against
discrimination because of their extensive coverage and liberal
interpretation. People with an intersex condition who suffer
discrimination in the provision of health care could assert that they
have been subjected to differential treatment because of their
perceived disability. Intersex activists could use disability laws and
join the battle with others in the critical disability movement who are
working to end the shame and stigma associated with disabilities and
disorders. If that goal is achieved, people with an intersex condition
would no longer require disability laws to protect them because the
perception that they are impaired and in need of fixing will have
been successfully debunked.
V. CONCLUSION
Intersex advocates began challenging current medical practices
in the mid-1990s. In a relatively short time, the intersex movement
has increased public awareness about health care issues facing the
intersex community and commenced a productive dialogue with
medical practitioners. These educational efforts have led to critical
changes to some formerly well-accepted practices. Doctors no longer
feminize all XY infants with smaller penises and they have stopped
recommending that people with a DSD be told lies or half truths
about their conditions.
Most doctors, however, still recommend that parents of
newborns with a DSD consent to medically unnecessary cosmetic
genital surgery on behalf of their children. Most parents follow their

231. Esther Morris Leidolf, An Additional Monologue, MRKR ORG. (Oct. 2000), http://
mrkhorg.homestead.com/files/ORG/AdditionalMonologue.htm.
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physician’s advice and approve of these procedures. Although the
law typically grants great deference to parents regarding the medical
decisions made on behalf of their children, traditional informed
consent procedures are inadequate to protect the best interests of
children with a DSD. Greater oversight of these procedures should
be imposed for a number of reasons:
• The surgeries affect important rights. These surgeries
have the potential to affect a person’s ability to engage in
satisfactory sexual relations. Although this is not a
fundamental right on par with the right to reproduce, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
constitutionally protected liberty interest encompasses
the ability to engage in intimate conduct.232 Surgeries
that affect an important constitutionally protected right
should only be performed with the informed consent of
the person undergoing the procedure. If the person being
subjected to the treatment is unable to consent, additional
safeguards should be imposed to ensure that these
important rights are not abridged.
• Parents may not be able to completely understand their
child’s interests. Parents who consent to cosmetic genital
surgery have their children’s best interests at heart.
When parents make these decisions, however, they are
visualizing their infants as children and not as adult
sexual beings. Studies show that parents consent to these
medical interventions because they are concerned about
the emotional well-being of their offspring as children.
Studies of adults, however, indicate that the majority of
adults would not want their parents to consent to these
surgeries, especially if there is a risk that the medical
procedure will affect their ability to engage in
satisfactory sexual relations.233 Therefore, these
procedures should not be performed under traditional
parental consent practices.
• These medical procedures are based on sex, gender, and
sexual orientation stereotypes. Although some infants

232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
233. See supra notes 166–69, 190–92, 197–98, and accompanying text.
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with atypical genitalia must undergo interventions to
repair conditions that threaten their health, most DSD
conditions do not impose any health risks. Most of these
surgeries are undertaken for purely cosmetic reasons.
These surgeries are performed based on false sex,
gender, and sexual orientation stereotypes, including the
assumptions that women prioritize cosmetic appearance
over sexual pleasure, men need a penis that will allow
them to urinate in a standing position, and all men and
women will want to engage in traditional heterosexual
intercourse. Sex stereotypes should not be used to
support life-altering health care practices.
• These surgeries are undertaken not because these infants
are actually disabled but based on the perception that
they are impaired. Most infants with a DSD are able to
participate in all major life functions and are not actually
disabled or impaired. They are subjected to invasive,
irreversible,
and
potentially
harmful
medical
interventions to bring their bodies into conformity with
societal norms. People who are perceived as disabled
should not be subjected to invasive procedures to
conform their bodies to societal expectations. The cure is
not the surgical alteration of the child; the cure is
educating society to accept bodies that are different.
Thus far, only one legal institution, the Constitutional Court of
Colombia, has been asked to address current medical procedures
performed on infants with a DSD. After an extensive analysis, the
Colombian court determined that standard informed consent
practices are inadequate to protect infants with a DSD from
potentially harmful medical procedures.234 Legal institutions in the
United States and other countries should follow the lead of Colombia
and consider imposing additional legal safeguards to ensure that the
rights of people with a DSD are adequately protected.
No study has proven that cosmetic genital surgeries benefit
people with a DSD, and evidence exists that these procedures can
lead to serious physical and emotional harm. Given the interests at
stake, courts and legislatures should consider imposing legal
234. Sentencia SU-337/99, Pt. I, supra note 98.
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safeguards to ensure that health care decisions made on behalf of
infants with a DSD are actually in their best interests. Legal
institutions should consider imposing a moratorium on these
procedures until they have been proven to be beneficial, enhancing
informed consent practices for these procedures, or requiring
external oversight or approval by a court or hospital ethics
committee.235
The law recognizes that people whose bodies, behaviors, and
identities are different require protection from societal
discrimination. Feminists and LGBT advocates have helped courts
understand how discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexual
orientation stereotypes constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.
Similarly, disability advocates have educated society and legal
institutions about the need to modify societal norms to fit the needs
of all people.
The justifications for performing cosmetic genital surgeries on
infants with a DSD are based on sex, gender, sexual orientation, and
disability stereotypes. Current norms require that children raised as
girls have female appearing genitalia, including a clitoris that is not
“too large” and a vagina that is capable of accommodating a penis.
These belief systems also require that children who are going to be
raised as boys have a penis that is capable of penetrating a vagina
and that allows the male to stand while urinating. Bodies that fail to
comport to these standards are often perceived as nonconforming,
disabled, and in need of repair. Typically, the “fix” is to subject these
children to surgeries that have, in some cases, led to lifelong physical
complications and psychological harm. Legal institutions need to
carefully consider whether these “fixes” constitute impermissible sex
and disability discrimination.

235. For a more extensive discussion of the potential advantages and disadvantages of these
options, see GREENBERG, supra note 2, at 35–43.
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